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The notion of consent . . . the law’s line between
intercourse and rape, is so passive that a dead
[woman] could satisfy it.1
Originally, criminal prohibitions on rape existed to protect a
man’s proprietary rights over the sexuality of his wife and the chastity
of his unmarried girl children.2 The law viewed women’s sexuality as
either pure (alternately as virginal, or as sanctified if the sex occurred
within the status of a lawful marriage) or as ruined.3 Therefore, the so-
cial harm of rape was the defilement of another man’s merchandise.4
The law was also concerned about protecting the accused under this
model,5 and therefore righteous women were expected to resist “to the
utmost” to demonstrate their refusal to engage in unwanted sexual
activities.6 Rape under common law required that sexual intercourse
* Professor of Law, UIC Law School. I would like to thank Jocelyn Varghese for her
outstanding research assistance. My thanks also go to Mohammad Abdelhafiz, whose
2018 presentation at UIC Law School (formerly The John Marshall Law School) on his
doctoral thesis sparked my interest in exploring the issues discussed in this Article.
1. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1300 (1991) (citing ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 129 (1987); SUSAN ESTRICH,
REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO 29–41 (1987))
(supporting her argument that the standard of consent under contemporary rape law is
so minimal as to be essentially meaningless).
2. See KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 44–45
(1996). The notion of property rights was so central to the early justification for rape
laws that punishment for violations often included restitution to the husband or father,
the purported victim of the crime. See id. at 68.
3. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual
Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1388–92 (2013) (describing raped women as having been
“defiled” and contrasting rape outside of marriage with spousal rape).
4. See id.; Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALEJ.L.&FEMINISM
1, 15 (2015).
5. MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634 (1847) (declaring
that rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused, tho [sic] never so innocent”); see also Brooks v. State, 452
A.2d 1285, 1290–91 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (citing People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d
247, 256 (Cal. 1975)) (discussing the propriety of using Hale’s infamous warning as a
jury instruction at rape trials).
6. See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 733 (Md. 1981) (Cole, J., dissenting) (“She
must follow the natural instinct of every proud female to resist, by more than mere
words, the violation of her person by a stranger or an unwelcomed friend. She must
make it plain that she regards such sexual acts as abhorrent and repugnant to her
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be obtained by force or threat of force.7 Viewed through such a singular
lens, rape was therefore a crime of violence.8 Feminist legal scholars
criticized this force and violence model, observing that it excluded
all but stranger rapes from the possibility of bona fide rapes.9
Efforts to reform the legal and social treatment of rape coincided
with the increased number of women in law schools and the legal pro-
fession.10 Beginning in the early 1970s, feminist scholars, activists,
and lawyers challenged the predominant narrative about rape as a
crime of violence and shifted attention to the ways in which victims of
rape experienced the injury as a loss of sexual autonomy.11 By 1977,
the sexual autonomy framework had taken hold, as exemplified by
the United States Supreme Court’s declaration in Coker v. Georgia
that rape “is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its
almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of
the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of choosing those with
whom intimate relationships are to be established.”12 Legal scholars
generally agree that, as a descriptive matter, the “country is converg-
ing on a single unifying principle: the right to sexual autonomy.”13
Despite five decades marked by progressive rape law reform,
however, there has been little significant change in the rate of rape
natural sense of pride. She must resist unless the defendant has objectively manifested
his intent to use physical force to accomplish his purpose.”).
7. The Model Penal Code (MPC) retained this focus on force by defining rape as
requiring compulsion “by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury,
extreme pain or kidnapping.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(a) (AM. L. INST. 1962).
8. Rusk, 424 A.2d at 733.
9. See Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 418–19 (2016); see
also MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 1300 (asserting that the law at the time failed to
recognize several unwanted sexual encounters as rape).
10. See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581,
587–603 (2009); Robin West, Women in the Legal Academy: A Brief History of Feminist
Legal Theory, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 980–82, 996 (2018).
11. Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 41, 63–64 (1993) (noting that reform states eliminated the common law
force element and redefined rape as nonconsensual intercourse); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U.PA.L.REV. 2151, 2171 (1995)
(noting that the 1970s feminist reforms marked the second series of rape law reforms, the
first being the 1950s work of the American Law Institute and its Model Penal Code);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11
L. & PHIL. 35, 36–40 (1992).
12. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). In Coker, the Court considered an
Eighth Amendment challenge to the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant con-
victed of rape. Id. at 586; see also Gruber, supra note 9, at 423 n.30 (quoting People v. Soto,
245 P.3d 410, 418 (Cal. 2011) (stating that “rape is [a] violation of ‘sexual autonomy’”));
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 463–65 (2016)
(noting that the consent/autonomy paradigm has also taken hold at the international level).
13. Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 1378; see also Gruber, supra note 9, at 416 (“Forcible
rape is totally passé, not in the sense that it does not occur, but in the current legal
conception of sexual assault’s essence.”).
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crimes.14 In fact, 2018 marked the sixth successive year in which the
rate of rapes rose.15 In rape trials, prosecutors and defense attorneys
struggle with the notion of consent.16 What does consent look like?
That is, how do we know when sex happens with the participants’
mutual willingness, free from undue coercion?
It is against this backdrop that I began my research on necro-
philia. Following Catharine MacKinnon’s criticism of the now-pre-
vailing consent model of rape law,17 I began to wonder what the line
actually was between access to a dead woman’s passive body and a
passive woman’s consent. My initial instinct was that necrophilia
laws, which I understood to be housed in the general category of
sexual offenses, would provide some insight. Surely the question of
consent when it comes to the sexual violation of a dead person would
provide a straightforward answer. The result of this speculation is
the following Article on the social harms of necrophilia.
INTRODUCTION
I. BACKGROUND: NECROPHILIA
II. SOCIAL-HARM TAXONOMY OF U.S. ANTI-NECROPHILIA LAWS
A. No Social Harm
B. Crimes Against Nature
C. Mistreatment of Corpses
D. Rights of Surviving Family Members
1. Misdemeanor Outrage to Family Members
2. Ohio
3. Felony Outrage to Family Members
E. Sex Crimes
1. Dead Body Required
2. Necrophilia




Does anyone really believe that if the law prohibiting
necrophilia were repealed, society would descend
into moral anarchy? It seems unlikely.18
14. See Gruber, supra note 10, at 627 n.242.
15. This is especially startling in light of the fact that violent crime rates have generally
been in decline since the early 1990s. Jamiles Lartey & Weihua Li, New FBI Data: Violent
Crime Still Falling, THEMARSHALLPROJECT (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.themarshallproj
ect.org/2019/09/30/new-fbi-data-violent-crime-still-falling [https://perma.cc /C55F-LF8K].
16. See Gruber, supra note 9, at 429.
17. See MacKinnon, supra note 1, at 1300.
18. JONATHAN HERRING, GREAT DEBATES IN CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2012).
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The word “necrophilia” likely conjures to mind images of dis-
gusting and depraved sexual activity. At the same time, references to
necrophilic acts as romantic expressions of undying love in our cul-
tural products are not uncommon. From William Shakespeare19 to
contemporary rapper Tyler, The Creator,20 creative types throughout
the centuries have used the image of sexual intimacy with or desire
for a corpse as a metaphor for superlative love.21 The polarizing con-
trasts by which society imagines necrophilia is reflected in how the
law treats associated activities—that is, whether the law chooses to
punish offenders harshly or to not criminalize necrophilic acts at all.
Necrophilia is not an everyday occurrence,22 fortunately. Never-
theless, necrophilia has been a concern to human societies since
ancient times. Practical measures to prevent living human beings
from engaging in sexual acts with the dead have been recorded since
19. Acting under the belief that his betrothed is dead, Romeo enters Juliet’s crypt
and mourns her by praising her beauty and expressing his desire for her. See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 5, sc. 3, ll. 22–39, 45–48, 74–120.
20. In the “She” music video, Tyler’s alter ego is a man who is stalking a young woman.
Tyler, The Creator, She (feat. Frank Ocean), YOUTUBE (June 3, 2011), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=mFNaFeIm4bU. He breaks into her bedroom to watch her as she sleeps
and later raps to her in a fantasy: “Gorgeous, baby you’re gorgeous/ I just wanna drag your
lifeless body to the forest/ And fornicate with it but that’s because I’m in love with you.” Id.
21. See Lisa Downing, Death and the Maidens: A Century of Necrophilia in Female-
Authored Textual Production, 14 FRENCH CULTURAL STUD. 157, 157, 164–67 (2003) (dis-
cussing the “simultaneous disgust and fascination” associated with necrophilia and
comparing two fictional works where the protagonists are self-identified necrophiles).
Numerous other examples exist: ADRIENNE MAYOR, THE AMAZONS: LIVES AND LEGENDS
OF WARRIORWOMENACROSS THE ANCIENTWORLD294–97 (2014) (depicting, in Greek myth-
ology, Achilles killing Penthesilea during the Battle of Troy and then falling in love with
her corpse); Pietro Pajetta, The Hatred (Museo Del Cenedese in Vittorio Veneto, It.) (1896)
(depicting an image that was based on Lorenzo Stecchetti’s Canto dell’Odio, which lyricized
the story of a spurned suitor who threatened to rape the corpse of the woman who rejected
him); MARÍA TERESA VERA, Boda Negra, on LAGRIMAS NEGRAS REMASTERED (Caribe Music
dos 2013) (describing the lover who digs his dead fiancé’s body up and brings her home
to perform a postmortem wedding ritual); Kati Horna, Oda a la necrofilia (Ode to nec-
rophilia) (photograph series) (The J. Paul Getty Museum, L.A., Cal.) (1962) (depicting a
woman who disrobes in front of a deathbed); HABLE CON ELLA (El Deseo, Antena 3
Televisión, Good Machine & Vía Digital 2002) (depicting the story of a male nurse that
rapes a comatose female patient); IDLEWILD (HBO Films, Mosaic Media Group, Atlas Enter-
tainment & Forensic Films (2006)) (depicting Andre Benjamin’s character serenading
his dead girlfriend as he prepares her for burial).
22. See ANIL AGGRAWAL, NECROPHILIA: FORENSIC AND MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS 113–53
(2011) (providing twenty case studies of some of the “[m]ost notable” necrophiles of the
past). But see John Troyer, Abuse of a Corpse: A Brief History and Re-theorization of
Necrophilia Laws in the USA, 13 MORTALITY 132, 150 n.9 (2008) (describing 1989 study
and quoting A. A. Brill: “I dare say [necrophilic acts] happen more frequently than is
known”); Dany Nobus, Over My Dead Body: On the Histories and Cultures of Necro-
philia, in INAPPROPRIATE RELATIONSHIPS: THE UNCONVENTIONAL, THE DISAPPROVED, &
THE FORBIDDEN 177–78 (Robin Goodwin & Duncan Cramer eds., 2002) (noting that
clinical and forensic data do not provide accurate information about the prevalence of all
necrophilic behaviors and fantasies).
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Before the Common Era.23 As has frequently been reported, ancient
Egyptians waited at least a few days after the death of a woman
before sending her cadaver to be embalmed to avoid tempting fu-
neral workers to engage in sexual acts with the corpse.24
Although necrophilia is not a rampant crime, the relative lack
of cases may also have to do with underreporting.25 Many necro-
philiacs seek out professions or other employment that give them
frequent and unsupervised contact with human corpses, which may
provide effective cover for their illicit activities.26 Cultural norms
also have an impact on reporting. For example, although the United
Kingdom formally outlawed necrophilia in 2003, criminologist Jason
Roach—studying the topic thirteen years later—uncovered exactly
zero prosecutions under the law.27 Roach hypothesized that the
reason why there are so few reported cases is not because there are
comparatively fewer active necrophiles in the United Kingdom, but
because of general British cultural embarrassment about the topic.28
As a result, when faced with necrophilic acts, British police and
prosecutors pursue less stigmatizing charges such as burglary.29 In
the United States, where the majority of states have some criminal
law that covers necrophilic behavior, the dearth of cases in appellate
reporters may also be the result of our robust plea bargaining sys-
tem; when apprehended and prosecuted for criminal violations,
offenders may take plea arrangements.30 It may also be the case
that convicted offenders do not appeal their convictions.
Most states have criminal laws that provide protection for dead
bodies against sexual contact.31 However, the rationales supporting
criminal prohibition vary widely. Some states frame the social harm
23. See Jonathan P. Rosman & Phillip J. Resnick, Sexual Attraction to Corpses: A
Psychiatric Review of Necrophilia, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 153, 153 (1989)
(citing HERODOTUS, THE HISTORIES—BOOK II (1956)). Rosman and Resnick’s article
studies 122 individual cases. Id. at 154.
24. Herodotus, Herodotus on Burial in Egypt, ANCIENT HIST.ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 18,
2012), https://www.ancient.eu/article/89/herodotus-on-burial-in-egypt [https://perma.cc
/HKX4-BUX3].
25. See Nobus, supra note 22, at 177–78 (noting the lack of “reliable data”).
26. See Rosman & Resnick, supra note 23, at 158; Nobus, supra note 22, at 178.
27. See Jason Roach, No Necrophilia Please, We’re British, in UNDERSTANDING NEC-
ROPHILIA: A GLOBAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 94–95 (Lee Mellor, Anil Aggrawal
& Eric Hickey eds., 2017).
28. See id. at 96.
29. See id.
30. Cf. Angela J. Davis, The Power and Discretion of the American Prosecutor, 49
DROIT ET CULTURES 55, 57 (2005) (citing U.S. Department of Justice statistics providing
that 95% of criminal cases are resolved through the plea-bargaining process).
31. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 201–09 (exploring state statutes that prohibit
necrophilia).
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of the crime as an injury to the emotions of surviving family mem-
bers, specifically rejecting the notion that the deceased’s dignity
rights survive death.32 Other states characterize necrophilia as a
form of sexual assault.33 Still others punish necrophilia through
laws prohibiting a wide variety of vague “crimes against nature,”
that may include sodomy and bestiality under this umbrella term.34
Identifying what social harm follows from necrophilic acts is
complicated, in part, because of the complicated legal status of a
person who was once alive but is now dead. After death, the corpse
occupies an ambiguous legal space where it is not entirely clear
what remaining rights or interests the body has.35 Nor is it clear
whether the deceased or her representative can or should be allowed
to vindicate any surviving interests that may have been threatened
or violated after death.36 A dead person (and the body that repre-
sents that dead person) is someone/something between subject of
the law and object of the law.37
To simply declare that the dead have no rights38 is to oversim-
plify an incredibly complex question. First of all, not every society
thinks of the deceased as absolutely dead, gone, and forgotten.39
Both Christians and Muslims believe in an afterlife, the quality of
which is determined by the deceased’s conduct during life.40 Pueblo
32. See id. at 201, 205.
33. Id. at 203, 209.
34. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1994).
35. See Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues
for Research After Life, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261, 262 (1998); Philippe Ducor, The Legal
Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 198 (1995).
36. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 35, at 262; Ducor, supra note 35, at 198.
37. For the philosopher Julia Kristeva, a human corpse represents a crisis in
meaning which she describes as abjection. JULIA KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN
ESSAY ON ABJECTION 1–13 (Leon S. Roudiez trans. 1982). The abject describes the
liminal state of being and not(-being) and this quandary causes feelings of horror and
disgust but also delight (jouissance) because abjection is a necessary stage in human
psychosexual development. Id. at 109 (describing the corpse as a “decaying body . . .
blurred between the inanimate and the inorganic, a transitional swarming, inseparable
lining of a human nature whose life is undistinguishable from the symbolic”). Put
differently: “[t]he offense of necrophilia is that it attempts, against all empirical evidence
to the contrary, to convert a subject that has become an object back into a subject again.”
Scott Dudley, Conferring with the Dead: Necrophilia and Nostalgia in the Seventeenth
Century, 66 ELH 277, 289 (1999).
38. See, e.g., Keller v. Finks, No. 13-03117, 2014 WL 1283211, *6 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
2014) (discussing decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights claim and concluding that dead
people do not have constitutional rights to assert).
39. See, e.g., Isola Olomola, Contradictions in Yoruba Folk Beliefs Concerning Post-Life
Existence: The Ado Example, 58 J. DES AFRICANISTES 107, 108–09 (1988) (discussing how
the Yoruba believe that death is really a transition from one type of existence to another).
40. See How the Major Religions View the Afterlife, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM (Sept. 29,
2020), https://www.encyclopedia.com/science/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and
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Indians understand death not as an end, but as a continuation of
life.41 It is not uncommon, therefore, for those who believe in a life
after death to engage in practices that acknowledge the presence of
the dead among the living. In her 2013 autobiography, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor described the weekend seances that her grandmother, an
espiritista or spiritual medium, would host to communicate with the
dead.42 Mexicans in both Mexico and the United States celebrate
Día de los Muertos each year.43 Following this tradition, the living
and the dead may exist on different planes, but they maintain the
ability to commune with each other throughout the year, and mani-
festly so on the Day of the Dead.44
As a result, even if science tells us that the dead are nothing
but decaying flesh and bones, the fact that they were once living
human beings means that sorting out whether and how long after
death the formerly living (or their legal representatives) are entitled
to assert the rights and interests they held in life is a legal question
bound up in our cultural understandings of death and in our living
commitments to honor the dead.45 The law commonly permits living
-maps/how-major-religions-view-afterlife [https://perma.cc/ZS8T-YACR]. Orthodox Jews
adhere to a strict set of funeral and burial practices, in accordance with the belief that
the dead will be brought back to physical life when the Messiah comes. See Nelkin &
Andrews, supra note 35, at 278–79 n.182. Jewish laws mandate that the body should not
be embalmed nor displayed after death. See id. at 280 (citing Lott v. State, 225 N.Y.S.2d
434 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962)). The Lott court awarded damages to the surviving family members
of two women whose corpses had been delivered to the wrong mortuaries due to a
hospital mistake. Lott, 225 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436–37 (1962). The Italian American woman’s
body was prepared for an Orthodox Jewish burial and the Jewish woman’s body was
buried with a crucifix and a rosary. Id. at 435–36. Importantly, the court carefully dis-
tinguished between injury to the deceased and injury to the feelings and emotions of
surviving kin and based its award squarely on the latter. Id. at 436.
41. See ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS, PUEBLO INDIAN RELIGION VOLUME 1 68 (1996). The
term “Pueblo Indians” describes a group of American Indian nations (e.g., Zuni, Hopi)
from the present-day states of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas. Id. at 1.
42. See SONIA SOTOMAYOR, MY BELOVED WORLD 23–25, 42–43 (2013).
43. The 2017 Disney animated film “Coco” tells a story about a Mexican family’s cele-
bration of the Day of the Dead. See Monica Castillo, An Enlightened Sense of Spirits,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2017, at C1. It was wildly popular and grossed over $800 million in
worldwide ticket sales. See Nancy Tartaglione, ‘Coco’ Sweet With $800M Milestone At
Worldwide Box Office, DEADLINE (May 1, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/05/coco-crosses
-800-million-global-box-office-disney-pixar-1202380459 [https://perma.cc/E5R8-6UZV].
44. See Castillo, supra note 43, at C2; see also Day of the Dead (Día de los Muertos),
HISTORY.COM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/halloween/day-of-the-dead
[http://perma.cc/Y6PS-PAU5].
45. “Science may prove, ever so clearly, that there is nothing there but carbon, and
oxygen, and lime, . . . but all this can never eradicate the sentiment we are considering.
It enters too deeply into our laws of thinking, our laws of speech, our most interior moral
and religious emotions.” Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 35, at 264 (quoting Editor’s Table,
HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Dec. 1853 to May 1854, at 690, 690); cf. Robin Marantz
Henig, The Crossing, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Apr. 2016, at 36–37.
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people to control what happens at their death and beyond in many
instances.46 Estate planning through wills, trusts, and other testa-
mentary instruments allow living testators to plan in advance for
events surrounding death and dying.47 A testator can control not only
who (or what) will inherit her property at death, but can also make
choices regarding organ donation and disposition of the body.48
This Article explores not just the interests that people might
have in their bodies after they die but what happens when these
interests are violated. Or, who or what is harmed when the bodies
of formerly living people are violated? And, what role does the crimi-
nal law have to play in punishing violators? Through a survey of
state laws on necrophilia, this Article specifically considers rights
and interests related to bodily integrity and sexual autonomy.
The Article will proceed as follows. Part I answers the question:
what exactly is necrophilia? It describes the current state of the
clinical and forensic definitions of this sexual disorder. A highly
detailed description of the different types of necrophilia can assist
in better framing what social harms are threatened when an of-
fender engages in necrophilic acts.
Part II answers the social harm question: how and why do
states prohibit and punish necrophilic acts? That engaging in sex
acts with dead human bodies is criminal is perhaps intuitively clear,
but, as the fifty-state survey in Part II reveals, there is no uniform
understanding among the states for the normative policy reasons for
46. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 35, at 278–79.
47. See Mary Randolph, 12 Simple Steps to an Estate Plan, NOLO (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/12-simple-steps-estate-plan-29472.html
[https://perma.cc/F3HN-KJ48].
48. Many of these end-of-life decisions are structured around the legal notion of
consent. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 35, at 277 (discussing that consent is key to
human research and after death, surviving family members claim the right of consent).
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1987, for example, allows for individuals to consent
to organ and tissue donation after death. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 (1987), 8A
U.L.A. 223 (2014). Because consent is such an important aspect of this decision-making,
if the decedent’s wishes regarding organ donation were not known prior to death, sur-
viving family members are prohibited from consenting on the deceased’s behalf. Nelkin
& Andrews, supra note 35, at 279. Nor can they overrule the deceased in the event that
the decedent previously declared a preference for other end-of-life plans. Id. Furthermore,
eight states and the District of Columbia now have death with dignity statutes that
allow competent adults with terminal illnesses to request medication to end their lives.
Death with Dignity Acts, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org/learn
/death-with-dignity-acts [https://perma.cc/FX8H-FHAP]. Montana case law allows for the
same. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1218 (Mont. 2009) (holding that physician-
assisted suicide for a terminally ill, mentally competent adult was not against public
policy). Although several bills have been introduced in the Montana state legislature to
ban the practice via statutory law, as of April 2019, none of these efforts have been
successful. See, e.g., Montana, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, https://www.deathwithdignity.org
/states/montana [https://perma.cc/HZX7-5M99].
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doing so. Part II creates identifiers and categories to organize the
existing anti-necrophilia laws in the United States, organizing them
according to different types of social harm. Not all criminal prohibi-
tions against necrophilic acts exist for the same stated purpose and
Part II presents an original taxonomy of U.S. necrophilia laws to aid
in sorting the various justifications along an understanding of the
normative reasons for criminalization. The Appendix summarizes
this information in chart form.
Although this Article does not take a normative stance on the
question of whether necrophilic acts should be criminalized or on
how severely offenders should be punished if they are, it highlights
the need to investigate these questions further. The survey con-
tained here reveals that the wide variety of approaches in the states
results in a significant disparity when it comes to severity of punish-
ment for convicted offenders. In addition, the categorization of these
necrophilic acts as sexual offenses in some states and not in others
means that convicted offenders may not be aware of a duty to regis-
ter as a sex offender upon a change of residence to a state in the
former category.
I. BACKGROUND: NECROPHILIA
This Part defines the key term, necrophilia. “Loving the dead”
actually comes in a variety of different psychological and physical
forms, only some of which probably ought to be criminalized.49 Necro-
philia is “an erotic attraction to corpses.”50 Although popularly under-
stood to be sex with dead bodies, necrophilia is actually best described
as a range of sexual practices related to what is commonly understood
to be an “abnormal and perverse sensuality.”51 Although diagnosed
necrophiles frequently report more than one motive for seeking to
satisfy their desires, the most common was “to possess an unresist-
ing and unrejecting partner.”52 Many necrophiles will seek jobs at
49. See Tyler Trent Ochoa & Christine Newman Jones, Defiling the Dead: Necro-
philia and the Law, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 539, 540–41 (1997).
50. Id. at 540. Ochoa and Jones argued that sexual activity with a corpse should be
considered a criminal offense, specifically arguing that California should amend its penal
code to prohibit all sexual contact with dead bodies. Id. at 576–77. The California legis-
lature adopted such a law in 2004. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052(a) (West
2020) (providing, “[e]very person who willfully mutilates, disinters, removes from the
place of interment, or commits an act of sexual penetration on, or has sexual contact
with, any remains known to be human, without authority of law, is guilty of a felony”).
51. Anil Aggrawal, A New Classification of Necrophilia, 16 J. FORENSIC & LEGAL
MED. 316, 316 (2008).
52. Rosman & Resnick, supra note 23, at 158. Clinical psychologist Dany Nobus hypo-
thesizes that, apart from seeking the power of complete domination over an unresisting
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hospitals, morgues, or funeral parlors because these occupations pro-
vide easy, frequent, and often unsupervised access to corpses.53
In 2011, Dr. Anil Aggrawal, a physician specializing in forensic
medicine, published a comprehensive epidemiological study of necro-
philia.54 After a lengthy review of case studies and the extant medi-
cal and psychological theories, Aggrawal concluded that necrophilia
is not a singular activity, but rather a spectrum of behavioral ten-
dencies with ten distinct tiers or classes.55
Classes I and II include necrophilic acts that involve atypical or
unusual sexual interests and behavior (paraphilias), but probably
do not require the regulation of criminal law because the necrophile’s
actions do not create social harms.56 Necrophiles in Class I, for ex-
ample, take pleasure in acting out role-play sexual fantasies.57 Class
I necrophiles seek out consenting partners and are aroused when
their partners pretend to be dead or lifeless while engaging in sexual
activities.58 Class II includes individuals who are unable to come to
terms with the actual death of their loved ones, and may continue
to interact with their bodies as if they were still alive for some time
after death.59 Necrophilia of the Class II–type is temporary or “tran-
sient in nature” and typically comes to an end once the surviving
family member finds an appropriate way to cope with the loss.60
To be clear, a person who has atypical sexual desires does not
necessarily have a mental disorder. The most recent edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) distinguishes between human behav-
ior that is unusual or atypical, and pathological behavior that causes
personal mental distress or creates a threat to the psychological or
physical well-being of others.61 The term “paraphilia” describes the
human body, at least some necrophiles seek pleasure in the act because of its very status
as an extreme taboo. Nobus, supra note 22, at 187.
53. See, e.g., Rosman & Resnick, supra note 23, at 158, 160. Rosman and Resnick’s
1989 study concluded that ninety-two percent of the “true necrophiles” that they had
studied were male. See Rosman & Resnick, supra note 23, at 156.
54. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at xvii.
55. See id. at 46.
56. Id. at 47–48, 51.
57. Id. at 47.
58. Id.
59. Id. Aggrawal calls these people “[r]omantic [n]ecrophiles.” AGGRAWAL, supra note
22, at 48. Romantic necrophiles might continue to have conversations or eat meals with
their dearly deceased. Id.
60. Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 317.
61. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASSOC., PARAPHILIC DISORDERS (2013). In fact, DSM-5 first
provides a standard for “normal” sexual arousal—“sexual interest in genital stimulation
or preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting
human partners” and then defines paraphilias by exclusion. Michael B. First, DSM-5
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former while “paraphilic disorder” is reserved for the latter category.62
Necrophilia is both a paraphilia and a paraphilic disorder, and the
psychiatric distinction has forensic relevance.
When it comes to enacting legislation criminalizing necrophilic
behavior, the distinction between desire (paraphilia) and disorder
(paraphilic disorder) is significant. Beyond Aggrawal’s Class II are
a range of behaviors that involve actual sex acts with dead bodies and,
therefore, describe activities which can be and probably ought to be
subject to criminal prohibitions.63 Not only do these behaviors harm
the rights and interests of others, those who engage in less serious
necrophilic acts are prone to seek sexual satisfaction by engaging in
increasingly dangerous and even deadly behavior over time.64
Class III necrophiles have sexual fantasies about death or dead
people.65 Unlike those in Class I, individuals in Class III are aroused
not by fictionalized death (as in role play), but by actual death and
actual dead people.66 Sometimes labeled “platonic necrophiles,”
those in Class III are aroused by physical proximity to, but do not
actually have sex with, the dead.67 By contrast, individuals in Class
IV need to touch dead bodies for sexual stimulation and satisfaction
but do not engage in intercourse.68 Class V comprises “fetishistic
necrophiles.”69 People who have a fetishistic necrophilia feel the need
to take something from a corpse’s body (e.g., clothing) or some part
of the corpse itself (e.g., a finger) as a fetish object.70 Class VI necro-
philes mutilate corpses while masturbating.71
and Paraphilic Disorders, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 191, 198 (2014). By definition,
therefore, non-penile sex and arousal when viewing pornography are paraphilias. Id. at
198–99.
62. See First, supra note 61, at 192.
63. See infra footnotes 65–80 and accompanying text.
64. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 85 (noting that many of the activities of
necrophiles will intensify over time, crossing class boundaries as their desires and be-
haviors change).
65. See Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 317.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 56 (otherwise known as “tactile necrophiles”).
69. See Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 318.
70. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 59–60.
71. See id. at 63. In what the local press called the “bloodiest killing” in Fremont,
California history, thirty-one-year-old Omar Pettigen confessed to shooting his mother.
Joseph Serna, Bloodiest killing in Fremont history is described in court documents, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-fremont-killing-petti
gen-details-interview-20151007-story.html. He cut her open, pulled out her heart, and
left it on her open chest. Id. He told police that after doing this, he went to an adjacent
room and masturbated. Id.; David Debolt, Malaika Fraley & Bay Area News Group,
Police: Fremont son shot mom, sliced her chest open, held her heart, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.santacruzsentinel.com/2015/10/06/police-fremont-son-shot
-mom-sliced-her-chest-open-held-her-heart-2. The acts committed by Pettigen likely
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None of the necrophiles described above actually have sexual
intercourse with corpses. Class VII necrophiles are the first in
Aggarwal’s ten classes who do.72 Individuals in Class VII are those
who do not regularly fantasize about or desire to have sex with the
dead; however, they are “opportunistic” necrophiles.73 That is, Class
VII necrophiles will engage in sex acts with a corpse if the opportu-
nity arises.74 Murderers who later, and only as an afterthought,
perform sexual acts on their dead victims are Class VII necrophiles.75
It is not until we reach the antepenultimate category in
Aggrawal’s classification system that we encounter what most com-
monly understand as necrophilia.76 In Class VIII reside the “classic[]”
necrophiles, those who have a preference for sex with the dead.77
Class IX necrophiles take it a step further; this category includes
individuals willing to kill someone in order to achieve the fantasy of
having sex with a dead person.78
In each of the previously described classes, the necrophile may
prefer sexual activity with corpses, but can achieve intercourse with
live partners.79 Unlike those in the classes previously described,
Class X necrophiles are completely unable to achieve arousal with
living partners and therefore seek out corpses to satisfy their sexual
desires.80
The preceding section described the most current psychological
and forensic literature on necrophilia. Knowing that there are several
different types of necrophilia can assist in a more accurate under-
standing of what social harms are threatened when an offender
engages in necrophilic acts.
II. SOCIAL-HARM TAXONOMY OF U.S. ANTI-NECROPHILIA LAWS
A majority of U.S. states have laws that criminalize one or more
of the acts described in Part I. Of the forty-six states that criminalize
qualify as Class VI necrophilia, also known as necromutilomaniacs. See discussion on the
mistreatment of corpses infra Section II.C.
72. Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 318.
73. Id.
74. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 67.
75. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 402–03, 409 (Dec. 2011) (finding the de-
fendant guilty of abuse of a corpse for inserting cucumbers into the mouth, vagina, and
anus of his murdered fiancée).
76. See Roach, supra note 27, at 88–89; Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 318.
77. See Aggrawal, supra note 51, at 318.
78. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 73. Serial killers such as Jeffrey Dahmer and
Ed Gein would fit into Class IX. See Nobus, supra note 22, at 177, 182.
79. See supra notes 56–77 and accompanying text.
80. See AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 84.
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necrophilic acts, thirty-one treat the crime as a felony and offenders
can be subject to harsh punishment.81 For example, offenders who
sexually penetrate dead human bodies in Nevada are potentially sub-
ject to life imprisonment.82 In January 2019, a Georgia man who
pleaded guilty to breaking into a funeral home and having anal sex
with the corpse of a dead woman received a twenty-year sentence.83
Yet despite the severe penal consequences at stake, there is no gen-
eral agreement among the states about what rights or interests are
injured by necrophilic acts or how to identify the associated social
harms that make the behavior criminal.
This Article does not take a normative position on what social
harms, if any, the acts related to necrophilia present. Nor does it
argue that absolute uniformity among the states is either required
or desired. Each state has an interest in individually identifying and
addressing social harms and the potential impact of those harms on
the state’s residents, and deference to the state legislative will is a
core principle of U.S. constitutional law.84 The recent increase in
state laws legalizing the recreational use of marijuana is a handy
example of the states’ power to engage in lawmaking that is tailored
to each state’s particular needs.85 What the Article does offer is the
81. The states that treat necrophilia as a felony are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
Although the statutory text of the Maryland law classifies the crime as a misdemeanor,
violations under the statute may be punished by up to ten years in prison, making it a
functional felony offense. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-322 (West 2002). Maryland
case law provides that, unless the legislature expressly provides otherwise, only crimes
that were felonies at common law are considered felonies. See Bowser v. State, 110 A.
854, 855 (Md. 1920). The misdemeanor classification, however, does not preclude the
imposition of a sentence of more than one year in prison. See State v. Canova, 365 A.2d
988, 993 (Md. 1976) (discussing Maryland legislation that allows for a twelve-year
sentence for the misdemeanor crime of bribery).
The result under Pennsylvania law is similar. Abuse of a corpse is a misdemeanor
offense that can be punished by up to two years in prison. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5510
(1972); 18 PA.CONS.STAT. § 106(b)(8) (2013). In Pennsylvania, misdemeanors are crimes
where the maximum punishment is five years. § 106(b)(6)–(8).
82. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.450(1) (2005) (categorizing sexual penetration of a
human body as a crime against public decency and good morals).
83. See WRBL, Man sentenced to prison after raping corpse at funeral home, KRON4
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.kron4.com/news/national/man-sentenced-to-prison-after
-raping-corpse-at-funeral-home/1740477218 [https://perma.cc/S8XZ-NMAX]; GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-7(b) (West 2010).
84. At least when it comes to commercial crimes, the United States Supreme Court
appears resolute in the notion that individual state legislatures ought to be allowed the
freedom and flexibility to identify and define diverse views of social harms. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729–31 (1963).
85. As of May 2019, ten states and the District of Columbia have legalized the adult
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observation that, in contradistinction to other mala in se crimes86—
such as murder or theft, where there is much more uniformity in
understanding and appreciating the root values and interests put at
risk when someone is killed or someone steals87—the same is not
true for necrophilia.
History and culture play a constitutive role in the construction
of social harm, and therefore our social understanding of the rights
and interests at stake when we consider a certain crime may evolve
and change over time.88 Although state laws criminalizing rape have
undergone significant changes over the past fifty years, for example,
the general state consensus now holds that sexual autonomy is the
primary human interest and right threatened by the crime of rape.89
The prevailing theory about the social harm of rape is that states
now criminalize rape to prevent and vindicate violations of an indi-
vidual’s sexual autonomy.90 Currently, however, there is no consen-
sus whatsoever among the states when it comes to the question of
the social harm or harms of necrophilia.91 In fact, there are remark-
able discrepancies in the various state approaches; these differences
lead to inconsistent penal consequences, including the collateral
consequences occasioned by sex offender registry laws.
use of recreational marijuana. See, e.g., Lea Lane, Want To Take A ‘Weedcation?’ Recrea-
tional Cannabis Now Legal In Ten States And DC, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/lealane/2019/04/20/a-reason-to-celebrate-420-recreational-cannabis-now
-legal-in-ten-states-and-dc/#2d23a2af5a6d [https://perma.cc/A9TL-XX5G]. The variety
of state approaches to the question is a good contemporary example of the principle of
anti-commandeering. See Caleb Seckman, Anti-Commandeering: A Modern Doctrine for
a Modern World, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 150, 189 (2019) (stating that marijuana
provides a good example of the “anti-commandeering” principle at work).
86. Distinguishing malum in se crimes from crimes that are malum prohibitum is
difficult because they are often categorized by exclusion from the other group. See Mark
S. Davis, Crimes Mala in Se: An Equity-Based Definition, 17 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 270,
271, 280–81 (2006). Nevertheless, malum in se crimes can generally be defined as crimi-
nal behavior that is considered to be a non-contingent wrong. See id. at 271. That is,
regardless of social or historical context, the bad act is considered to be criminal and
worthy of social regulation and punishment. Id. Non-contingent wrongs include murder,
theft, and rape. See id. at 271–73. The understanding of necrophilia as anti-social,
morally wrong, and criminal are not likely to change over time. It is for these reasons
why I categorize necrophilia as a crime malum in se.
87. See Peter Westen, Reflections on Joshua Dressler’s Understanding Criminal Law,
15 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 311, 330–31 (2018) (quoting JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTAND-
ING CRIMINAL LAW 113–14 (7th ed. 2015)).
88. See infra footnotes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of rape
and sexual assault law).
89. See Gruber, supra note 9, at 416–17 (observing that lawmakers and legal scholars
have abandoned the notion of rape as a crime of force and violence).
90. See id. at 422–23 (describing the nature of rape today as harm to personal
autonomy).
91. See infra Appendix.
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Before presenting the taxonomy of social harms associated with
anti-necrophilia laws, here is a basic description of what is meant
by the critical term. Social harm is the “negation, endangering, or
destruction of an individual, group, or state interest which [is] deemed
socially valuable.”92 In the context of criminal law, harm is social
because the injury is experienced not only by the individual victim
of the harm, but also by society as a whole.93 This is why we have pub-
lic prosecutors that represent the state, not the individual victim, in
criminal prosecutions.94
Yet, as observed by Albin Eser in 1965, most state definitions
of crime do not contain any reference at all to social harm.95 Instead,
the various penal codes rely on a formalistic understanding of crime
as mere disobedience to the dictates of the power of the state to regu-
late social conduct.96 In Illinois, for example, crime is simply “a vio-
lation of any penal statute of this State.”97 Nevada defines crime as
“an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable upon conviction
by death, imprisonment, fine or other penal discipline.”98 New York
continues to define crime as “a misdemeanor or a felony,”99 but follow-
ing in the example of the Model Penal Code,100 has supplemented
this formal definition with language in the general purposes section.101
New York’s Penal Code now declares that one of its main purposes
92. Albin Eser, The Principle of “Harm” in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative
Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 413 (1965).
93. See Lawrence C. Becker, Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes,
3 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 262, 269–71 (1974) (arguing that this is what distinguishes public
criminal prosecutions from remedies under the civil law).
94. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSE-
CUTOR 10 (2007) (citing European scholar Cesare Beccaria who noted that “crime should
be viewed as a societal problem, not simply as a wrong against an individual victim”).
95. See Eser, supra note 92, at 351.
96. Id.
97. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-12 (2012). The section announcing the general
purposes of the Criminal Code of 2012 does not include any reference to social harm what-
soever. See id. ch. 720, 5/1-2. Academics who study Illinois law have made social harm
an important consideration, proposing the following definition: “Illinois criminal law is
law that defines as illegal and makes punishable by criminal sanctions behavior that
involves a perceived social harm.” JOHN F. DECKER & CHRISTOPHER KOPACZ, ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 1.02 (5th ed. 2012).
98. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.120(1) (2019).
99. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 2019).
100. The MPC incorporates the notion that some sort of social harm is a prerequisite
to crime. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux: On Same-
Sex Marriage, the Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John Stuart
Mill’s Essay On Liberty (1859), H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle 17–18 (U. Chi.
Pub. L. & Legal, Working Paper No. 437, 2013) (citing the MPC’s chief reporter, Herbert
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1432 (1968)).
101. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 2006) (describing the general purposes of
New York penal law).
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is to “proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes
or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.”102
Eser argued that modern criminal law analysis is incomplete
without an examination into the material wrong of the crime.103
That is, social harm cannot be understood as the mere “breach of
law.”104 If the criminal law is to mean anything more than the bare
power of the state to control the behavior of its residents, our under-
standing of “crime” should encompass more than mere disobedience
or violations of enacted laws.105 The true meaning of a prohibited act
or omission lies in identifying what the material wrong is and why
the criminal law seeks to protect against that particular injury.106
Legal academics have pursued Eser’s material wrong agenda
with greater fervor than the states.107 The most popular Criminal
Law casebook in U.S. law schools includes social harm in its elemen-
tal definition of crime.108 A leading treatise provides that there is
“universal agreement that society and government may not justly
penalize human activities as long as they are not harmful in fact.”109
The MPC declares as a primary purpose of the criminal law, “to
forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts
or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests.”110
Not a mere academic issue, the social harm requirement is also
a constitutional one about substantive due process—what Eser calls
the “utility principle.”111 The U.S. Constitution limits the states’
ability to use criminal law to regulate conduct.112 Substantive due
process principles allow courts to invalidate criminal laws when that
102. Id. § 1.05(1). In 1965, New York law used a mere disobedience definition. See
Eser, supra note 92, at 348 (quoting Section 2 of the New York Penal Code defining crime
as “an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable by death or imprisonment”).
103. See id. at 351.
104. See id. at 348.
105. See id. at 349; Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 144–45 (1999) (citing JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH:
A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 22, 24 (1997) (explaining resistance to Catharine
MacKinnon’s call to regulate pornography on the basis of harm to women, warning that
this aggrandizes state power that could be used to oppress the queer community)).
106. See Eser, supra note 92, at 348.
107. Harcourt, supra note 105, at 134 (noting that “[m]ost of the leading criminal law
scholars either adopted the harm principle or incorporated it into their writings”).
108. JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 147–48 (6th ed. 2012). The casebook I use also speaks about social harm as element
of crime. CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 6–7
(3d ed. 2014). But see Westen, supra note 87, at 334–35 (arguing that social harm is not
an essential element of crime).
109. Eser, supra note 92, at 363.
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2009).
111. See Eser, supra note 92, at 354.
112. See id. at 398–99 (explaining that criminal provisions are required to be in
harmony with the Constitution).
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legislation bears no substantial relationship to a matter of legiti-
mate public concern.113 Put differently, states must provide reasons
that justify their criminal laws. That a prohibited activity must be
associated with some social harm (either in its result or by its exis-
tence) is, therefore, a fundamental feature of U.S. law.114
In a 1997 article, legal scholars pushing for enactment of a necro-
philia statute in California—none existed at the time—observed
that the states took three approaches to punishing necrophilic acts.115
Reviewing statutes and case law from the fifty states, the authors
examined how prosecutors could use existing laws to prosecute and
punish offenders.116 This Article, by contrast, will propose an origi-
nal taxonomy of why states seek to punish necrophilic acts.
Five distinct formulations of the social harms associated with
necrophilia emerge from a close textual reading of the statutes, rele-
vant legislative history, and case law. The first category included in
the taxonomy below is “no social harm.” In other words, it is possible
that in the few remaining states that do not have anti-necrophilia
laws, it is because their legislatures see no related rights or interests
to protect or has not yet been confronted with a case necessitating
such protections. The majority of states, however, fall into one of the
remaining four categories—(2) crimes against nature; (3) mistreat-
ment of corpses; (4) the rights of surviving family members; and (5)
sex crimes.
A. No Social Harm
Four states currently lack any criminal prohibitions on behaviors
associated with necrophilia.117 In these states, it may be that the
113. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
114. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 10–11 (5th ed. 2010) (describing the harm
principle as the fourth basic premise of criminal law; the others are actus reus, mens rea,
concurrence, causation, punishment, and legality).
115. Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 550. The three categories were: (1) case law
interpreting rape and sodomy statutes to include necrophilic acts; (2) case law interpreting
abuse of corpse statutes to include necrophilic acts; and (3) express statutory bans on
necrophilic acts. See id. John H. Troyer similarly groups U.S. laws into three types: (1)
abuse of corpse laws, (2) necrophilia laws that explicitly prohibit sex acts with corpses,
and (3) unnatural acts or crimes against nature. See Troyer, supra note 22, at 135.
Troyer briefly mentions the social harms associated with each type of law, but is less
interested in how the law deals with the necrophile as he is in how the law treats the
dead human body. See id. at 134.
116. See Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 550–63, 565–66 (describing the approaches
of different states in classifying the crime).
117. The four states are Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, and New Mexico. See infra
Appendix. The District of Columbia does not have a necrophilia statute, but it does have
case law stating that sexual abuse of a corpse can be the basis of a civil suit. See Steagall
v. Drs. Hosp., 171 F.2d 352, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (recognizing the right of surviving family
members “to possess, preserve and bury, or otherwise to dispose of, a dead body,” the vio-
lation of which is a tort).
368 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:351
legislatures do not understand the harms associated with necro-
philic acts to be social harms that ought to be regulated, or have
simply not yet been called upon by actual incidents in order to ad-
dress these harms.
One could reasonably argue that because a corpse has ceased to
exist as a human person—because her heart has stopped beating,
because her brain stem has stopped functioning118—she cannot be
harmed by nonconsensual treatment of her body after death. A
Michigan court held just that in a case involving the murder of a
female sex worker and the subsequent sexual penetration of her
corpse.119 The court vacated the defendant’s felony murder convic-
tion, reasoning that the State had not proven that the defendant
had committed the predicate felony of sexual assault because the
victim was already dead.120 “A dead body is not a person. It cannot
allege anything. A dead body has no will to overcome. It does not
have the same potential to suffer physically or mentally as a live or
even an unconscious or dying victim.”121 Interestingly, the court
concluded its opinion by asking the state legislature to fill the gap
by enacting a necrophilia law signaling that while sexual assault
may not be the correct label, what this defendant did was deserving
of blame.122
A number of states that now have anti-necrophilia laws did not
have them until tabloid events compelled the state legislatures into
action.123 For example, Washington passed its law after Ronald
Shawn Ryan broke into a funeral home two times in a period of six
days in 1992.124 During the first incident, Ryan stole several items
and caused property damage to furniture and office equipment.125
He also made sexual contact with the bodies of three elderly women
who had been prepared for burial.126 During the second incident, Ryan
broke in, stole items, and again had sexual contact with a dead
woman’s body.127 The police apprehended Ryan on his third attempt
to enter the funeral home.128 At Ryan’s trial, the court declared that,
118. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1 (NAT’L CONFERENCE COMM’RS. ON UNIF.
STATE L. 1981).
119. See People v. Hutner, 530 N.W.2d 174, 175–76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
120. Id. at 176–77.
121. Id. at 176.
122. See id. at 176 n.1. Michigan’s mutilation of a dead body statute, listed in Section
II.C, would not cover what Hutner did to his victim. See infra Section II.C.
123. See, e.g., Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 539 (citing Frank B. Williams, Two
Valley Men Arrested in Sex Assault on Corpse, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at B5).
124. Id. at 562 (citing State v. Ryan, 899 P.2d 825, 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)).
125. Id. at 562 n.139.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 563.
128. Id.
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without a necrophilia statute, the only victim was the funeral home—
not the corpses.129
Likewise, California added the crime of felony sexual penetration
with a dead human body to its penal code during the 2003 legislative
session after a startling incident called the public’s attention to the
fact that no law prohibited such contact.130 Four-year-old Robyn Gillet
had died of the flu while in the hospital and the driver who had been
assigned to transport her body to the morgue was caught on security
cameras sexually assaulting her body.131 The State pursued criminal
charges against the driver, Donald Luis Cooper, under the only then-
existing relevant statute, a Health and Safety Code section related to
mutilation of human remains.132 State Representative Sharon Runner
of the Thirty-Sixth District, where Robyn was a constituent, pushed for
a new anti-necrophilia law, arguing that without a separate necrophil-
ia crime, California would “only promote disrespect for the deceased.”133
B. Crimes Against Nature134
Crimes against nature (CAN) statutes are purposely broad and
vague, and therefore, may be used by prosecutors to criminalize
129. Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 563 n.140 (quoting the unpublished opinion of
State v. Ryan Nos. 33607-0-1, 35017-0-1, 34293-2-1, at *828 n.2 (July 31, 1995)). Interest-
ingly, Washington had previously criminalized necrophilia under its crimes against
nature statute, but had repealed it with a set of criminal law reforms in 1975. See id. at
562; Jolayne Houtz, Man Gets 10 Years For Abuse Of Bodies—Crime At Funeral Home
Is ‘Shocking’, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 12, 1993), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive
/?date=19931012&slug=1725731 [https://perma.cc/A57S-ZRD8].
130. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West 2003) (as amended by Assemb. B.
1493, 2003–2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003)).




133. Assemb. B. 1493, 2003–2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). Representative
Runner requested an excused absence for the February 24, 2003 assembly meeting in order
to attend Robyn’s funeral. Assemb. Daily Journal, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess., at 476 (Cal. 2003).
134. This approach is used by Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and North
Carolina. See infra Appendix. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) seems to take
a similar approach, covering sexual acts with a corpse as an “indecent act” under Article
134. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 art. 134; see also United States v. Mabie, 24 M.J. 711, 713
(C.M.R. 1987) (holding that sexual acts with a corpse are indecent under UCMJ Art. 134).
In Mabie, the court explained: “ ‘indecent’ signifies that form of immorality relating to sex-
ual impurity which is not only grossly vulgar, obscene, and repugnant to common pro-
priety, but tends to excite lust and deprave the morals with respect to sexual relations.”
Id. (quoting MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. V, ¶ 90c (1984); see also
United States v. Sanchez, 11 C.M.A. 216, 218 (C.M.A. 1960) (holding that sexual pene-
tration of a chicken is indecent per se under UCMJ Art. 134). In Sanchez, the court
reasoned that the harm of indecent sex acts like bestiality and lewd activity with a child
was a discredit to the armed services. Id. at 219. But see United States v. Anderson, 36
M.J. 963, 979 (C.M.R. 1993) (discussing the Government’s submission that the UCMJ
does not criminalize necrophilia).
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necrophilic behavior. Notwithstanding their malleability, however,
CAN laws do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the social harms
associated with necrophilia. A euphemism for “unconventional sex in
its various forms,”135 most state laws prohibiting “crimes against na-
ture” do not specifically define what behavior is prohibited under this
label.136 Indeed, as the Illinois Supreme Court put it in 1897: “[i]t was
never the practice to describe the particular manner or the details . . .
as the abominable crime [was] not fit to be named.”137 The Illinois high
court refused to provide further guidance in the case law, declaring,
“the records of the courts need not be defiled with the details of differ-
ent acts which may go to constitute [a crime against nature].”138
The very ambiguity of CAN laws is what provides states the
flexibility to pursue criminal charges for any atypical, unpopular, or
deviant sex act,139 including “all unnatural copulation with mankind
or a beast.”140 Idaho’s CAN law, for example, is written broadly enough
to encompass necrophilic acts.141 It subjects “[e]very person who is
guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with man-
kind or with any animal” to a minimum of five years in prison.142
Because of its breadth, Idaho law might also be utilized to punish
anal sex, oral sex, masturbation, prostitution, incest, and bestial-
ity.143 These very different and distinct activities are among the many
and varied that could fall under a generic CAN statute.144 Necrophilia
is not uncommonly included in a parade of horribles, along with
bestiality and pedophilia, as sexually deviant conduct.145 Thus,
135. David Abbott, Crimes Against Language and Nature, 3 SCRIBESJ.LEGALWRITING
149, 149 (1992).
136. See Honselman v. People, 48 N.E. 304, 305 (Ill. 1897).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., M. Blake Huffman, North Carolina Courts: Legislating Compulsory
Heterosexuality by Creating New Crimes Under the Crimes Against Nature Statute
Post–Lawrence v. Texas, 20 L.&SEXUALITY 1, 6–7 (2011) (describing how North Carolina
courts have interpreted the state’s CAN law broadly).
140. State v. Cyr, 198 A. 743, 743 (Me. 1938) (applying the liberal doctrine broadly
interpreting Maine’s CAN law).
141. See IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1972).
142. In its entirety, Idaho Code § 18-6605 provides: “Every person who is guilty of the
infamous crime against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punish-
able by imprisonment in the state prison not less than five years.” Id. It resides in Chapter
66, titled “sex crimes.” See also Troyer, supra note 22, at 142.
143. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 139, at 6–7 (detailing how North Carolina courts
have found such crimes to fall within the purview of the state’s CAN law).
144. See, e.g., id. at 6; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003) (noting
that early sodomy laws sought to prohibit all manner of nonprocreative sexual activity).
145. In 2014, Paul Stam, a state legislator from North Carolina spoke against including
sexual orientation as a protected class. Elizabeth Leland, Wake: Pedophilia and bestiality
are sexual orientations, Republican lawmaker suggested, CHARLOTTEOBSERVER (Oct. 12,
2016), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/special-reports/permission-to-hate/article
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“carnal[] know[ledge of] a dead body” in Minnesota is criminalized as
misdemeanor bestiality.146
But it is with anti-gay sodomy bans that CAN laws are most
notably and inextricably linked.147 In sum, CAN laws are “[r]ooted
in nothing more than moral and religious disapproval of nonprocre-
ative sex acts that have become historically associated with homosex-
uality.”148 Morality legislation in the form of CAN laws criminalized
sex between gay men because gay sex—included under the label of
sodomy—was the object of public revulsion and outrage.149 Then, in
its 2003 decision, Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged a substantive due process right of sexual intimacy for consent-
ing adults and held that states could no longer punish consensual
sexual activity between adults.150 After Lawrence, state laws151 that
treat necrophilia as a “crime against nature” similar to sodomy152
are inadequate in modern times.153
105754116.html [https://perma.cc/T6PQ-8667]. He argued, as the Traditional Values
Coalition has, that sexual orientation would include not only LGBTQ people, but also
pedophiles and necrophiles. Id.
146. MINN.STAT.ANN. § 609.294 (West 1987) (providing, in relevant part, that “[w]ho-
ever carnally knows a dead body or an animal or bird is guilty of bestiality”). Violations
of Minnesota’s bestiality law were previously punishable at up to twenty years, but the
law was amended in 1963. See id. advisory committee’s note to the 1963 amendment.
The legislature determined that twenty years imprisonment was “excessive” and “more
a product of revulsion to this type of crime than to the social harm in fact committed.”
Id.
147. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV.
631, 645–46 (1999).
148. Alexis Agathocleous, When Power Yields to Justice: Doe v. Jindal and the
Campaign to Dismantle Louisiana’s Crime Against Nature Statute, 14 LOY. J. PUB. INT.
L. 331, 333 (2013).
149. One of the arguments Michael Hardwick raised in his constitutional challenge
to the Georgia sodomy law was that there was no rational basis for the law, except “the
presumed belief . . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.” See Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558
(2003). The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the law is “constantly based
on notions of morality.” Id.
150. 539 U.S. at 564; see also Huffman, supra note 139, at 2.
151. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-322 (West 1957) (titled “Unnatural or
perverted sexual practice”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14
-177 (1994) (found to be unconstitutional as applied, State v. Whiteley, 616 S.E.2d 576,
577 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)); see also Troyer, supra note 22, at 137 (listing Maryland and
Massachusetts). Maryland also has a separate sodomy law and a separate law regarding
mistreatment of a corpse. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-321 (repealed 2020) (sodomy);
MD.CODEANN.,CRIM.LAW § 10-404(c) (West 2008) (indecent conduct in a cemetery). The
latter would fall into this Article’s second category of social harms. See supra notes
117–33 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 cmt. at 421 (AM.L. INST. 1980) (noting that
several states punish necrophilic acts on the basis of analogy to sodomy and bestiality,
two serious offenses at common law).
153. Following Lawrence, states have an incentive to more specifically describe what
actions are punishable by their CAN statutes. See Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock:
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Basing criminal sanctions on judgments of “sexual perversion”
and disgust is problematic because it endows the state and its
agents to elect among and place varying values and protections on
different sexual acts. In a pre-Lawrence and even pre-Bowers case,154
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee considered whether
cunnilingus counted as an act prohibited under the state’s CAN
law.155 Writing in 1973, the majority concluded that it was.156 Judge
Charles Galbreath dissented, reasoning that whereas cunnilingus
was “so universally accepted now as normal,” necrophilia—which had
at that point not been the subject of criminal regulation in Tennes-
see—was “the most loathsome, degrading and vile sexual activity
imaginable” and “so horrible as to be repugnant to all but the most
depraved.”157 Judge Galbreath’s endorsement of oral sex as “normal”
and his designation of necrophilia as “vile” without an additional
explanation of what rights and interests were being violated is
exactly what is wrong with using CAN laws to punish necrophilia.158
The disgust towards necrophilia so evident in Judge Galbreath’s
dissenting opinion recalls the unadorned animus for gay men that
characterize anti-sodomy laws.159 His reasoning appeals to moral
intuitions about “depraved” activity, but does not adequately explain
why the criminal law should be involved.160 Certainly, necrophilia
was not the precise legal issue before Judge Galbreath at the time,
but his rhetorical reliance on a visceral response to make his point
demonstrates why CAN laws are unsatisfactory vehicles for the
criminal law.161
The “public revulsion and outrage” associated with gay sex—or
bestiality or necrophilia—are simply insufficiently precise descriptions
of a social harm to justify the imposition of criminal punishment.162
That is not to say that bestiality and necrophilia should be decrimi-
nalized. But, after Lawrence, states seeking to punish bestiality and
The Role of Harm in the Criminalization of Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905, 1930–32
(2015) (describing Jeremy Bentham’s “felicific calculus” as serving as the basis for his
opposition to anti-sodomy laws, despite his personal revulsion for gay sex).
154. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s sodomy stat-
ute against various constitutional challenges), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
155. Locke v. State, 501 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1973).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 829 (Galbreath, J., dissenting).
158. See id.
159. See id. at 828–29.
160. Id. at 829.
161. See Locke, 501 S.W.2d at 829 (Galbreath, J., dissenting).
162. Cf. Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 564; Eric A. Johnson, Harm to the “Fabric
of Society” as a Basis for Regulating Otherwise Harmless Conduct: Notes on a Theme
from Ravin v. State, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 41, 68 (2003) (“[A]rguing that some existing
human reaction patterns have social utility and so are worth preserving.”).
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necrophilia as “crimes against nature” ought to contemplate more
concrete, social-harm-based reasons for doing so.
C. Mistreatment of Corpses163
Like CAN laws, many state anti-desecration of corpse statutes
are broad enough to encompass the prohibition of necrophilic acts.164
As distinct from the anti-necrophilia statutes described in subpart
E below, however, mistreatment of corpse statutes do not specify sex
acts as desecration, although some contain language requiring proof
of wantonness.165 South Dakota law, which prohibits removal of all
or part of a dead body from a burial site, is fairly representative of
the breadth of mistreatment or abuse of corpse statutes.166 Section
34-27-19 requires that the South Dakota prosecutor prove that, in
removing the body, the offender intended to sell or unlawfully dissect
it, or that he acted with “malice or wantonness.”167
The social harm associated with desecration of a corpse is that the
mistreatment of a dead body is “an outrage upon the public feel-
ings.”168 The state laws considered in this Section likewise frame sex-
ual activity with the dead as another form of desecration that violates
community social norms. This notion is best illustrated in a 1939
Maine case, where the State sought to prosecute Frank E. Bradbury
for indecently burning a dead human body.169 Frank’s sister Harriet
died at home.170 After her death, Frank dragged her body into the
163. Thirteen, in total: Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
164. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-600(A)(3) (2010) (“It is unlawful for a person
wilfully [sic] and knowingly, and without proper legal authority to . . . desecrate human
remains”); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6205(a)(1) (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.160
(1974); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-3-404(3) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 644:7 (1973);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1161.1(B) (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.08(a)(1) (West 2017);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3761 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-126 (1995).
165. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-19 (1972) (disinterment of dead bodies, re-
quiring “mere wantonness”); § 97-29-25 (1972) (desecration of cemeteries or corpses).
166. S.D.CODIFIEDLAWS § 34-27-19 (1977) (“Every person who removes all or any part
of the dead body of a human being from any grave or other place where the same has
been buried, or from any place where the same is deposited while awaiting burial, with
intent to sell the same or to dissect it without authority of law, or from malice or wan-
tonness, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”).
167. Id. “Wantonness” is not defined in the South Dakota criminal code, but a 2008
case involving child pornography relied on Black’s Law Dictionary to define “lewd” as
“[o]bscene or indecent; tending to[ward] moral impurity or wantonness.” State v. Dubois,
746 N.W.2d 197, 208 (S.D. 2008) (citing Lewd, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).
168. State v. Bradbury, 9 A.2d 657, 659 (Me. 1939) (citing Kanavan’s Case, 1 Me. 226,
227 (1821)).
169. Id. at 657.
170. Id.
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cellar where he loaded her body—head first—into the furnace to burn
it, causing dark smoke and a foul smell.171 The furnace was not large
enough to fit the entire body so Frank had to keep pushing it in as it
was consumed.172 In concluding that the State had properly charged
Frank, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine had to grapple with the
underlying question of social harm.173 The court explained that the
way in which Frank had cremated his sister was unacceptable and
therefore indecent because shoving his dead sister’s body into a fur-
nace was contrary to the norms and expectations of the community.174
A subset of mistreatment of corpse laws are those that specifi-
cally prohibit dissection or mutilation of corpses.175 These can be used
to address the behaviors exhibited by Class VI necrophiles, or necro-
mutilomaniacs.176 Class VI necrophiles do not typically engage in
copulatory activity with a dead body, instead they mutilate the corpse
for the purpose of sexual pleasure.177 Laws that sanction the mutila-
tion of dead bodies, like Wyoming’s178 or Michigan’s,179 address this
type of necrophilia.
In 2008, for example, Michigan’s mutilating a dead body statute180
was used to prosecute a man who raped the victim prior to killing
her.181 After killing her, he “shoved his fist into her vagina, causing
damage to her vaginal area.”182 The appellate court affirmed his
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 658.
174. Bradbury, 9 A.2d at 658–59. “The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that
it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right
or wrong.” Id. at 658 (quoting J. OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 (1881)).
175. See infra Appendix.
176. AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 63–66; see, e.g., ME.REV.STAT.ANN.tit. 17-A, § 508(1)
(West 2020) (“A person is guilty of abuse of corpse if he intentionally and unlawfully
disinters, digs up, removes, conceals, mutilates or destroys a human corpse, or any part
or the ashes thereof.”). Oklahoma law also addresses concealment or mutilation. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1611.1 (West 2008) (“Jenny’s Law”). It was passed in 2009 after
Jennifer Snipes’s murderer burned her body after raping her in order to conceal his crime.
See Senate Approves Bill to Protect Oklahomans from Predators, OKLA.SENATE (May 23,
2008), https://oksenate.gov/press-releases/senate-approves-bill-protect-oklahomans-preda
tors [https://perma.cc/J3HV-Z34F]; 2008 Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 10–11 (West). Another
aim of a law like Oklahoma’s would be to give the surviving family an opportunity to
provide a proper burial or other death rite. Cf. State v. Stephens, 203 So.3d 134, 139
(Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (applying an abuse of corpse statute).
177. AGGRAWAL, supra note 22, at 60. According to Aggrawal, “class VI necrophiles get
an orgasm simply by mutilating the dead body.” Id.
178. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-502 (2017) (“[A] person who dissects or mutilates a dead
human body is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5)
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both.”).
179. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.160 (West 1974).
180. Id.
181. People v. Pena, No. 275508, 2008 WL 681888, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2008).
182. Id.
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five- to fifteen-year prison sentence.183 The court cited irreparable
damage and disfigurement to the victim’s body as a justification for
the conviction.184 In an earlier case, the Michigan Supreme Court had
previously concluded that the law sought to protect the surviving
family’s right to receive the intact corpse for burial.185
D. Rights of Surviving Family Members
In the same vein, yet another approach to criminalizing the vari-
ous activities associated with necrophilia is to frame the social harm
of these acts as a violation of the rights of the surviving family mem-
bers of the deceased.186 Five states in this category follow the Model
Penal Code (MPC) approach which seeks to protect against the out-
rage that a reasonable family member would experience if their loved
one were to be the victim of sexual abuse after death and punishes
this crime as a misdemeanor offense.187 One state—Ohio—treats nec-
rophilia as a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on whether out-
rage to the surviving family extends to the community in general.188
Five others frame the harm of necrophilia as outrage to the family,
but are distinguished from the MPC states because they punish the
crime as a felony.189
1. Misdemeanor Outrage to Family Members
Article 250 of the MPC covers “riot, disorderly conduct, and
related offenses,” including Section 250.10 “abuse of corpse,”190 the
statutory provision that would cover necrophilic acts. The MPC in-
cludes “sexual indecency” towards a dead body as abuse of corpse, but
specifically rejects categorization of this crime as a sexual offense.191
Instead, the MPC frames the social harm of necrophilic acts as out-
rage to the friends and family of the deceased.192 In the explanatory
183. Id.
184. Id. at *6–7.
185. Deeg v. City of Detroit, 76 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Mich. 1956).
186. See infra Appendix.
187. The five states are Colorado, Delaware, Hawai‘i, Ohio, and Pennslvania. See infra
Appendix.
188. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (West 1996).
189. See ALA.CODE § 13A-11-13 (2002); ARK.CODEANN.§ 5-60-101(a)(2)(A) (2011); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.120 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-312(1)(a) (2006); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-14(a) (West 2010).
190. Model Penal Code § 250.10 provides, simply: “Except as authorized by law, a person
who treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage ordinary family sensibilities
commits a misdemeanor.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
191. Id. § 250.10 cmt. at 421 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
192. Id.
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note to Article 250, the MPC drafters declare that the offenses con-
tained in Sections 250.9 through 250.12 are “not likely to generate
disorder, [but] are widely recognized as instances of public nui-
sance.”193 The drafters explained that the decision to list abuse of a
corpse under the category of Offenses Against Public Order and
Decency as distinct from Sexual Offenses was because “we were
concerned primarily with preventing physical aggressions, whereas
here we deal with outrage to the feelings of surviving kin, outrage
which can be perpetrated as well by mutilation or gross neglects as
by sexual abuse.”194 The MPC frames the social harm of necrophilia
as a dignitary one that negatively impacts surviving family mem-
bers.195 For the MPC drafters, necrophilic acts amount to nothing
more serious than undignified treatment of the dead body. Undigni-
fied treatment of the dead, including necrophilia, is criminal because
this type of treatment can predictably result in outrage to family
members. The harm impacts the immediate family of the deceased
and society criminalizes this behavior because, by extension, necro-
philic acts “harm the living public as a whole.”196
The MPC approach is also distinct in that it grades the crime
as a misdemeanor, explaining that “[g]reater penalties seem plainly
excessive in light of the fact that the harm involved is only outrage
to sensibility.”197 Five states strictly adhere to the MPC approach.198
The facts of a 2011 Delaware case—Delaware is a MPC state199—
help illustrate the impact of necrophilia on surviving family mem-
bers.200 Emmett Taylor and Stephanie Mumford were engaged to be
married.201 When the couple failed to appear at a scheduled wedding
193. Id. at 311–12.
194. Commonwealth v. Suder, 436 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Pa. 1981) (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 250.10 cmt. at 40 (AM. L. INST., Tent. Draft No. 13)).
195. Harcourt, supra note 105, at 126 (quoting Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and
Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 77 (1995)). Importantly, the MPC drafters included a
discussion of harm for each “moral offense” of the common law which it decided to punish.
Id. at 137.
196. Hilary Young, The Right to Posthumous Bodily Integrity and Implications of
Whose Right It Is, 14 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 197, 198 (2013). Here, Young is describing
moral objections to the posthumous display of preserved human cadavers, but the dig-
nitary objection she raises here is equally applicable to necrophilia. See id.
197. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.10 cmt. at 424 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
198. Id. at 422. Followed by Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-101(1)(b)-(2) (2005)),
Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1332 (1995)), Hawai‘i (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-
1108(1) (West 2015)), Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (West 1996)), and
Pennsylvania (18 PA.CONS.STAT. § 5510 (1972)). The commentaries in the Hawai‘I Revised
Statutes specifically contemplates “sexual contact (necrophilia)” as outrageous treatment
of a human corpse. See HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 711-1108 (West 2015) (editor’s note).
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1332 (1995).
200. Taylor v. State, 28 A.3d 399, 402 (Del. 2011).
201. Id.; see also Cassandra Kramer & Hallie Jackson, Court Documents Provide
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rehearsal, Mumford’s family drove to the home that Taylor and
Mumford shared.202 When the family arrived, they discovered the
house covered in blood and Mumford’s body behind a door on the
second floor.203 Police found ten photos of “Mumford lying on the floor
of their townhouse with cucumbers inserted in her mouth, vagina,
and anus” in Taylor’s cell phone.204 The trial jury convicted Taylor
of abuse of a corpse.205 In affirming the conviction, the Delaware
Supreme Court explicitly cited outrage to ordinary family sensibili-
ties as the core harm of the crime in affirming Taylor’s conviction.206
Although Taylor was sentenced to death for his act of murder, stand-
ing alone, the abuse of corpse charge sentence would have been
limited to one year.207
2. Ohio
One state straddles the line between a strict MPC approach and
those states that treat the crime as a felony offense by treating the
crime alternatively as a misdemeanor or as a felony.208 Ohio’s anti-
necrophilia statute punishes abuse of a corpse based on two different
standards, depending on whether the conduct outrages the family
of the deceased (a misdemeanor) or if it outrages the community in
general (a felony).209 The law’s sentencing scheme survived constitu-
tional scrutiny when challenged in 1989 by a man who had been
convicted for felony abuse of a corpse.210
In that case, State v. Gardner, a mortician was indicted after
his boyfriend, a funeral attendant, told the police about an incident
during which he and the defendant-mortician engaged in various
sexual acts, including intercourse, with a female corpse at their
workplace.211 The boyfriend pleaded guilty to misdemeanor abuse of
a corpse and later testified at the defendant’s trial.212 By contrast,
Details About Woman’s Murder, WBOC16 (Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.wboc.com/story
/6968338/court-documents-provide-details-about-womans-murder [http://perma.cc/35UC
-B84J] (relating a history of domestic violence prior to Mumford’s murder).
202. Taylor, 28 A.3d at 402.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 403.
205. Id. at 404 (discussing Taylor’s conviction for abuse of a corpse and for possession
of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony). The trial court sentenced Taylor
to death. Id.
206. Id. at 408–09.
207. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4206(a) (1989).
208. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(C) (1996).
209. Id.
210. State v. Gardner, 582 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
211. Id. at 1015.
212. Id. at 1016.
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the defendant was found guilty of felony abuse of a corpse and sen-
tenced to one year in prison.213 The defendant raised two separate
constitutional challenges on appeal: arguing that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.214
In rejecting both of the defendant’s constitutional claims, the
Ohio Court of Appeals held that the statute was not void for vague-
ness because the two standards (outrage to family versus outrage to
the community) could be “commonly understood by persons of com-
mon intelligence.”215 The court explained that criminal statutes are
not vague when they require conformance to “an imprecise but
comprehensive normal standard,” only when there is no standard.216
The court likewise rejected the defendant’s Equal Protection chal-
lenge, concluding that the distinction between the two standards
was a rational one.217 Furthermore, the court held that the defen-
dant’s conduct toward the corpse “would certainly offend and out-
rage the entire community despite the lack of personal relationship
with the deceased.”218
3. Felony Outrage to Family Members
Finally, the anti-necrophilia laws in Alabama,219 Arkansas,220
Kentucky,221 Tennessee,222 and West Virginia223 are also framed as
dignitary harms to surviving family members, but unlike the MPC,
always punish these crimes as felonies.224
213. Id. at 1015.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1017 (quoting State v. Glover, 479 N.E.2d 901, 904 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)).
216. Gardner, 502 N.E.2d at 1017.
217. The court found that “a rational distinction can be made between conduct or
treatment of a corpse which, although it would certainly offend and outrage the family
of the deceased, would not necessarily offend and outrage the community in general.” Id.
218. Id.
219. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-13 (2002).
220. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-101(a)(2)(A) (2011). Abuse of a corpse is a class C felony,
subjecting offenders to three to ten years in prison. Id. § 5-4-401(a)(4).
221. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.120 (West 2019). Abuse of a corpse is a class D felony,
subjecting offenders to one to five years in prison. Id. § 532.60(2)(d); see also Sanborn v.
Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 549 (Ky. 1988) (citing commentary to the Kentucky rape
statute which specifically excludes from its purview the sexual violation of dead bodies).
222. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-17-312(a)(1) (2006). Violations are a class E felony, subject
to one to six years in prison. Id. §§ 39-17-312(c), 40-35-111(b)(5).
223. W. VA.CODE ANN. § 61-8-14(a) (West 2010). The term “desecrate” includes a wide
variety of actions that would include necrophilic acts. See id. § 61-8-14(b)(3) (“ ‘[D]esecrate’
means destroying, cutting, mutilating, effacing, injuring, tearing down, removing, defacing,
damaging or otherwise physically mistreating in a way that a reasonable person knows
will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or discover his or her actions.”).
224. See supra notes 219–23 and accompanying text. While it treats outrage to
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Under Alabama law, “[a]buse of a corpse” occurs when a person
“knowingly treats a human corpse in a way that would outrage
ordinary family sensibilities.”225 “[A] way that would outrage” in-
cludes, but is not limited to, sexual intercourse with a dead human
body.226 The commentary following Section 13A-11-13 of Alabama’s
Criminal Code notes that it was adapted from MPC § 250.10 and
that it consolidates all of the former separate sections dealing with
“conduct involving a corpse which may outrage the ordinary family
sensibilities.”227 Regarding the standard for measuring outrage, the
commentary provides: “[t]he family must be outraged, which proba-
bly would be demonstrated partly by its pursuit of the offense. The
sensibilities of the family must be ordinary, denoting the contempo-
rary local community standard.”228 Offenders convicted under this
statute are subject to one to ten years in prison.229 The Supreme Court
of Arkansas has interpreted a similar provision to depend on the in-
terpretation of the jury, using its common sense and experience to
assess the standard set by the statute.230
A related, non-criminal law approach to achieving similar pro-
tections for the surviving family is through the quasi-property theories
of torts law.231 The theory of quasi-property rights is a gap-filler
where criminal laws do not exist.232 These claims are not proprietary
in the typical sense of ownership,233 but property law provides an
existing legal theory that delivers postmortem rights vis-à-vis the
dead body to surviving kin.234 The “bundle” of quasi-property rights
reasonable family sensibilities as a misdemeanor, Ohio’s offenses against human corpse
law treats outrage to reasonable community sensibilities as a felony of the fifth-degree
offense. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01(B)–(C) (West 1996). The Ohio statute’s reach
is not limited to necrophilia. See id. It has also been used to prosecute non-sexual treat-
ment of corpses. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 93 N.E.3d 178, 180, 184–85 (Ohio Ct. App.
2017) (describing that defendant placed her newborn baby into a plastic bag shortly after
delivering her).
225. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-13(a) (2002).
226. See, e.g., Padgett v. State, 668 So.2d 78, 84–85 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (distinguish-
ing the separate crimes of rape and abuse of a corpse).
227. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-13 (2002) (editor’s note).
228. Id.
229. Id. § 13A-11-13(b); see id. § 13A-5-6(a)(6) (describing the proscribed sentencing
range for Class C felonies in Alabama).
230. Williams v. State, 468 S.W.3d 776, 782 (Ark. 2015).
231. See Burgess v. Purdue, 721 P.2d 239, 244 (Kan. 1986).
232. See Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 231–32 (1872).
233. Although the U.S. Constitution protected the right of white people to own human
beings as chattel property, most slavery has been outlawed since the end of the Civil
War. Compare U.S.CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1 (slavery clause), and Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. 393, 411–12 (1856), with U.S.CONST. amend. XIII. We no longer speak of human
beings as property. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
234. See Christensen v. Superior Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 184 (Cal. 1991).
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in the corpse include “the right to custody of the body; to receive it in
the condition in which it was left, without mutilation; to have the body
treated with decent respect, without outrage or indignity thereto;
and to bury or otherwise dispose of the body without interference.”235
The surviving family member with the “quasi-property” interest in
the dead body may not do with the corpse what she might do with
any other piece of chattel property.236 Rather, her ownership rights
are limited to “hold[ing] it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all
who may from family or friendship have an interest in it.”237 Follow-
ing this theory, when this sacred trust is violated, the surviving
family may sue as rights holder.238 Notably, Kansas and Louisiana,
two states that do not currently have anti-necrophilia laws, frame
mistreatment of corpse tort claims using quasi-property theories.239
E. Sex Crimes
The majority (eighteen) of state anti-necrophilia laws fall into the
category of sex crimes.240 Twelve states explicitly require either sexual
contact with a dead body or contact with a dead body for the purpose
of sexual gratification.241 Three more explicitly use the term “necro-
philia” in defining the offense.242 Finally, another three states frame
the harm of the sexual assault of a corpse as a violation of sexual auto-
nomy by including the crime with other per se consent provisions.243
1. Dead Body Required
Twelve states may not use the word “necrophilia” to define the
offense, but they do specifically require sexual contact with a dead
235. Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, Inc., 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W. Va. 1985).
The plaintiff in Whitehair sued on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
alleging that the defendant funerary services provider treated her relatives’ bodies in a
wanton and reckless manner when it was hired by the state to relocate buried bodies.
Id. at 439–40. Surviving relatives may also assert claims even after the corpse has been
interred, including the right to notice and a reasonable opportunity to be present when
bodies are relocated from one resting place to another. Id. at 441.
236. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 242–43.
237. Id. at 243.
238. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., The Constitution After Death, 121 COLUM. L. REV. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 10).
239. See Burgess v. Perdue, 721 P.2d 239, 244–45 (Kan. 1986); Blanchard v. Brawley,
75 So. 2d 891, 893–94 (La. Ct. App. 1954).





body: Alaska,244 California,245 Florida,246 Illinois,247 Indiana,248 Iowa,249
Nevada,250 New Jersey,251 North Dakota,252 Oregon,253 Utah,254 and
Washington.255 As compared to the generalized prohibitions on the
mistreatment or desecration of corpses discussed above in Section
C (mistreatment of corpses), the state laws considered here unam-
biguously require proof of sexual contact with a corpse.256 This is
true regardless of the individual code section’s placement within the
rest of the statutory scheme and regardless of the title of the indi-
vidual crime. Therefore, although Alaska’s Section 11.61.130 is titled
“[m]isconduct involving a corpse,” because the Alaska legislature has
defined that crime as “engag[ing] in sexual penetration of a corpse,”257
it is counted as a sex crime here.
Washington’s law is emblematic of the statutory prohibitions in
this group by defining the crime without flourish: “[a]ny person who
has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a dead human body.”258
Washington passed the current law in 1994259 after police caught a
young man burglarizing a funeral home.260 Besides damaging prop-
erty and theft, Ronald Shawn Ryan also engaged in sexual contact
with the corpses of several women whose bodies were being prepared
244. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.130(a)(2) (1978).
245. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052(a) (West 2020).
246. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.06 (1996).
247. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-20.6(b)(1) (West 2012); H.B. 5122, 97th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012). The legislation won unanimous approval in the Illinois
House. Springfield at Work: State House Votes to Ban Necrophilia, NBC CHI. (Mar. 29,
2012), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/state-house-votes-to-ban-necrophilia/195
3052 [https://perma.cc/J4WU-UZNU].
248. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-11-2(2) (West 2014).
249. IOWA CODE § 708.14(1) (West 2010). Enacted in 1996, this section was later ex-
panded to include mutilation to conceal a crime. ROBERT R.RIGG,IOWAPRACTICE,CRIMINAL
LAW VOLUME 4 § 6:67 (2019–2020 ed.). It is a specific intent crime. Id. § 6:68.
250. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.450 (West 2005).
251. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:22-1(a)(3) (West 2002).
252. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12 (1973) (defining the crime of deviate sexual act);
§ 12.1-20-02(2) (defining the term “deviate sexual act”).
253. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.087(1)(a) (West 1993).
254. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-704(2)(e) (West 2007).
255. WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 9A.44.105 (West 1994) (the crime of “[s]exually violating
human remains”). State v. Starbuck is the only case published in the appellate court
reporters since the statute was enacted in 1994. See State v. Starbuck, 355 P.3d 1167,
1177 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing that defendant killed his ex-wife and then inserted
a dildo into her vagina).
256. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.130(a)(2) (1978).
257. Id.
258. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.105(1) (West 1994).
259. 1994 Wash. Sess. Laws 52.
260. Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 562; see also supra notes 124–29 and accom-
panying text.
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for burial.261 In Washington, the crime is treated as a class C felony
with a maximum penalty of five years in prison, a fine up to $10,000,
or a combination of both a prison term and a fine.262
Notably, while all twelve states require the same act (sexual con-
tact with a corpse), a significant disparity exists in the way the states
impose penalties on convicted offenders. Alaska’s crime is treated as
a misdemeanor.263 Likewise, North Dakota.264 The maximum pen-
alty for offenders convicted of performing a “deviate sex act” in
North Dakota is one year in prison and/or a fine of $3,000.265 Alaska
and North Dakota are the most lenient of the states in this group.266
At the other end of the scale are Florida and Nevada. Florida’s
“[a]buse of a dead human body” is a second-degree felony punishable
by up to fifteen years in prison.267 To determine sentences, courts in
Florida use an Offensive Severity Ranking Chart to compute a
sentence score for felony offenders.268 Abuse of a dead human body
is ranked at Level 7 on a ten-degree scale, with Level 10 “being [the]
most severe.”269
Offenders in Nevada are subject to the most severe penalty of
the states—life in prison with the possibility of parole.270 Moreover,
although Nevada’s law is located in the penal code’s chapter on
“crimes against public decency and good morals,” offenders convicted
under the statute are required to register as sex offenders.271 So are
261. Ochoa & Jones, supra note 49, at 562–63 (citing State v. Ryan, 899 P.2d 825,
825–26 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ryan, Nos. 33607-0-1, 35017-0-1, 34293-2-1 at
*828–29 (Wash. Ct. App. July 31, 1995)).
262. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.20.021(1)(c) (West 2015).
263. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.130 (1978).
264. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12 (1973).
265. Id. (deviate sex act); § 12.1-20-02(2) (defining “[d]eviate sexual act” as “any form
of sexual contact with an animal, bird, or dead person”); § 12.1-32-01(5) (describing the
penalty for conviction of a class A misdemeanor).
266. CompareALASKA STAT.§11.61.130(a)(2) (1978),andN.D.CENT.CODE§12.1-20-12
(1973), with 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-20.6(b)(1) (West 2012).
267. See FLA.STAT.§ 872.06(2) (1996) (defining the offense); id. § 775.082(3)(d) (setting
out the maximum punishment for second-degree felonies). Florida passed its abuse of a
dead human body statute in 1996 after two teenagers allegedly conspired to dispose the
body of the first boy’s mother. Michael Griffin, Senate Passes Bill to Outlaw Necrophilia,
ORLANDOSENTINEL (Mar. 28, 1996), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-1996
-03-28-9603270913-story.html [https://perma.cc/FG3T-6NRE]. In doing so, the second boy
had sexual intercourse with her corpse. Id.
268. FLA. STAT. § 921.0022(3)(g) (2020).
269. Adam J. MacLeod, The Law as Bard: Extolling a Culture’s Virtues, Exposing Its
Vices, and Telling Its Story, 1 J. JURIS. 11, 23 (2008); see also FLA. STAT. § 921.0022(3)(g)
(2020) (listing Level 7 offenses, including DUI resulting in serious bodily injury (FLA.STAT.
§ 316.193(3)(c)(2) (2020)), practicing medicine without a license (FLA. STAT. § 458.327(1)
(2011)), and female genital mutilation (FLA. STAT. § 794.08(4) (2018)), among others).
270. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.450(1) (West 2005).
271. Id.; see also id. § 179D.441 (outlining the duty to register); § 179D.097(1)(m) (de-
fining “sexual offense” to include sexual penetration of a dead human body).
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convicted offenders in Washington272 and Iowa.273 The other nine
states in this group may not mandate registration for similar offenses,
but the states that do require new residents who were convicted
elsewhere for analogous crimes to register upon moving.274
2. Necrophilia
Only three states—Arizona,275 Georgia,276 and Rhode Island277—
actually use the term “necrophilia” in the statutory text defining the
offense. In each of these jurisdictions, the material elements of each
definition of necrophilia are essentially the same—sexual intercourse
with a dead human body.278 Each of these states treats necrophilia
as a felony offense, but whereas Arizona’s maximum prison sentence
for a class 4 felony is three years,279 in Georgia and Rhode Island,
judges may impose a prison term of anywhere between one and ten
years.280 Yet, none of these three states require convicted necrophiles
to register as sex offenders.281
In Arizona, “[i]t is unlawful for a person to engage in necro-
philia.”282 Necrophilia itself is defined as “[h]aving sexual intercourse
with a dead human body”283 and is classified under a list of “[c]rimes
against the dead.”284 These provisions do not appear in Arizona’s
criminal code, however.285 Rather, Arizona’s necrophilia statute is
272. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(1)(a) (West 2017).
273. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.102(1)(b)(13) (West 2020).
274. See, e.g., IOWACODEANN. § 692A.102(1)(b)(28) (West 2020) (imposing registration
requirement for “[a]ny sex offense specified in the laws of another jurisdiction, or any sex
offense that may be prosecuted in a federal, military, or foreign court, that is comparable
to an offense listed in” the Iowa Sex Offender Registry); § 692A.102(1) (imposing a regis-
tration requirement for any sex offense under the prior laws of other jurisdictions); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130(4)(a)(iv) (West 2017) (for new residents); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 179D.097(1)(u) (2007) (defining “sexual offense” for which registration is mandated as
an “offense committed in another jurisdiction that, if committed in this State, would be
an offense listed in this subsection”).
275. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1364(D) (West 1998) (defining necrophilia as a Class 4
felony, punishable by one and one-half to three years in prison).
276. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7 (1977) (allowing necrophilia to be punishable by one to
ten years in prison).
277. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2 (1998) (outlining that necrophilia is punishable by
one to ten years in prison and a fine up to $10,000).
278. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1364(E) (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7(a) (1977);
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2 (1998).
279. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-702(D) (West 2008).
280. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7(a) (1977); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2 (1998).
281. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1364(E) (West 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7(a) (1977);
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2 (1998).
282. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1364(D) (West 1998).
283. Id. § 32-1364(D)(1).
284. Id. § 32-1364.
285. Id.
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located in Title 32, which sets out regulations for Professions and
Occupations.286 Namely, it falls under Chapter 12’s rules for the
Funeral Directors and Embalmers.287 The law specifically considers
funeral home workers within its purview, but also reaches beyond
these professionals.288 The Pima County Attorney’s Office invoked
the statute in 2013 when it prosecuted a man who had used his cell
phone to videotape himself having sexual intercourse with his un-
responsive girlfriend.289
Rhode Island did not have a law prohibiting necrophilia in 1997,
when Charles Smith confessed to police that, after stabbing his step-
daughter approximately fifteen times and believing her to be dead,
he had sex with her body.290 The State charged Smith with murder
and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree.291 At his trial,
the medical examiner was unable to definitively conclude whether
the victim was dead or alive at the time of the sexual assault.292
Because of this uncertainty, the trial court granted Smith’s motion
for judgments of acquittal on the sexual assault charges.293
Rhode Island law now defines the crime of necrophilia as follows:
“Any person who performs the act of first degree sexual assault upon
a dead human body shall be guilty of the crime of necrophilia.”294
The actus reus of first-degree sexual assault is “engag[ing] in sexual
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1364(D) (West 1998).
289. State v. Peoples, 378 P.3d 421, 421–22 (Ariz. 2016); see also State v. Peoples, No.
2 CA-CR 2014-0408, 2015 WL 4599646, at *1–2 (Ariz. App. July 30, 2015) (providing
additional facts), rev’d, 378 P.3d 421 (2016).
Tuscon paramedics responded to a 911 call at an apartment building and found an
unresponsive woman in her bed. Peoples, 378 P.3d at 423. After the paramedics pronounced
her dead, a police officer found a smart phone in the woman’s bathroom. Id. When he
opened the phone, the officer saw a paused video image of the unclothed woman in her
bed. Id. The officer pressed play and watched a portion of the video that depicted a man
having sex with the woman, who was “seemingly unresponsive” during the encounter.
Id. The man was Robin Peoples, the woman’s boyfriend. Id.
During a subsequent interview with the police, Peoples confirmed that he had sex with
the woman in the early hours that morning and that he had filmed the encounter on his
cell phone. Id. at 424. Peoples also told police that the woman was “probably” dead while
he had sex with her, although he had heard her snoring and thought she was breathing
at some earlier point. Peoples, 378 P.3d at 424. The police arrested Peoples and charged
him with necrophilia and two other counts of sexual assault. Id. at 424.
Peoples entered a motion to suppress the video evidence found on his cell phone,
arguing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell phone as an overnight
guest in the woman’s apartment at the time of the search. Id. at 428. In 2016, the
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Peoples’s motion. Id.
290. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 917 (R.I. 2001).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 918.
293. Id. at 918 n.1.
294. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2 (1998).
2021] NECROPHILIA 385
penetration with another person.”295 Sexual penetration is defined
broadly under Rhode Island law, as
sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse, or
any other intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person’s
body or by any object into the genital or anal openings of another
person’s body, or the victim’s own body upon the accused’s in-
struction, but emission of semen is not required.296
Necrophilia is a felony offense and a person convicted for necrophilia
faces a one- to ten-year prison sentence.297 In the words of a critical
commentator, “the Rhode Island legislature . . . considers necrophilia
equally as culpable as sexual assault.”298 Notably, however, Rhode
Island does not require registration as a sex offender for individuals
convicted of necrophilia.299
Georgia’s law is quite similar to Rhode Island’s in both scope
and punishment.300 Georgia also treats necrophilia as a felony of-
fense with a maximum prison sentence of ten years, and contains a
wide scope of sexual activity relevant to the crime.301 “A person com-
mits the offense of necrophilia when he performs any sexual act
with a dead human body involving the sex organs of the one and the
mouth, anus, penis, or vagina of the other.”302 The statute has been
invoked by prosecutors on various occasions since the state legisla-
ture passed it in 1977.303 Under Georgia law, both necrophilia and
295. Id. § 11-37-2.
296. Id. § 11-37-1(8).
297. Id. § 11-20-1.2.
298. MacLeod, supra note 269, at 21.
299. 11 R.I.GEN.LAWS § 11-37.1-2(v) (2020) (listing first-degree sexual assault but not
necrophilia as “sexually violent offenses” for which an offender would be required to regis-
ter under Rhode Island’s Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification law).
300. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7(a) (1977), with 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-20-1.2
(1998).
301. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-7(a) (1977).
302. Id.
303. Robert E. Cleary, Jr., Unnatural Sex Acts, in KURTZ CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
DEFENSES IN GEORGIA 10 (2020 ed.); see also Norman v. State, 781 S.E.2d 784, 787 (Ga.
2016) (affirming defendant’s conviction for necrophilia on the strength of his confession
and other circumstantial evidence presented at trial); Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791,
796, 798 (Ga. 1997) (affirming defendant’s convictions for necrophilia and murder when the
trial evidence demonstrated that defendant shot his victim on two separate occasions before
sodomizing her). Although there are only a few reported appellate cases, Georgia prosecu-
tors have made frequent use of the necrophilia statute. See, e.g., Bryce Mursch, Georgia
man indicted on necrophilia charge, WIS NEWS (July 3, 2006, 12:49 AM), https://www
.wistv.com/story/4765464/georgia-man-indicted-on-necrophilia-charge. In 2006, Forsyth
County charged Parker Clayton Ward with necrophilia after finding a woman’s dead
body in a suspicious position with her clothing disturbed. See id. Ward admitted to police
that he had attempted to have sex with the woman, although he denied knowing that
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rape are sexual assault crimes that seek to protect the underlying
value of consensual sex.304
Whether a jurisdiction has an anti-necrophilia law can lead to
a frustrating paradox for prosecutors seeking to vindicate the right
of sexual autonomy through a rape prosecution. If a person is the
victim of a sexual assault while alive and survives, the state prose-
cutes the attacker for rape. When the victim of sexual assault dies
during the attack, however, the states are split.
In Lipham v. State, for example, the Georgia Supreme Court
heard the appeal of a defendant convicted for, inter alia, rape and
murder.305 Lipham is a perimortem rape case, where the sexual as-
sault occurred at or near the time of death.306 The defendant argued
that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
rape because the prosecution had not proved that he had sexual
intercourse with his victim before he killed her.307 In essence, the
defendant raised a “necrophilia defense” to the rape charge.
The Georgia high court affirmed Lipham’s conviction for rape.308
In doing so, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that if he
killed his victim and only thereafter had sex with her, he would be
guilty only of necrophilia.309 The court concluded that the rape statute
was equally applicable in cases where the defendant has used deadly
force to achieve sexual intercourse.310 In so doing, the court distin-
guished between perimortem rape and necrophilia, the latter crime
she was dead at the time Id. In 2008, a jury found Wallace Muhammed guilty of murder,
necrophilia, and other charges after Muhammed broke into a motel room occupied by his
victim. Zachary Hansen, Man strangled woman, had sex with her corpse, set her body on
fire, ATL.J.CONST. (May 10, 2018), https://www.ajc.com /news/crime--law/man-strangled-
woman-had-sex-with-her-corpse-set-her-body-fire/dByKV4JyUKt4Gu5tEwqMqJ [http://
perma.cc/6J6X-PXTT]. After killing her and having sex with her corpse, Muhammed set
her body on fire. Id. He was sentenced to life in prison. Id. Most recently, in January 2019,
a sentencing court imposed a fifteen -year sentence for a man charged with necrophilia
after being caught having anal sex with a corpse on a funeral home’s security cameras.
BET Staff, Homeless Man Pleads Guilty to Breaking Into Georgia Funeral Home And
Having Sex With Corpse, BET (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.bet.com/news/national/2019
/01/30/homeless-man-pleads-guilty-to-breaking-into-georgia-funeral-home.html [http://
perma.cc/KK6L-M4QB].
304. See Lipham v. State, 364 S.E.2d 840, 842–43 (Ga. 1988).
305. Id. at 841.
306. See id. at 842.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 843.
309. Id. at 842.
310. Lipham, 364 S.E.2d at 842 (holding that even if penetration occurred after the
victim’s death, both the force element and the lack of consent element would be fulfilled,
making the crime rape). As for consent, the court cites a per se rule regarding victims
who are drugged, asleep, unconscious, or in a coma. See id. at 842–43. The court concluded:
“We see no reason why it should be any less applicable in a case in which the defendant
has rendered the victim permanently unconscious by killing her.” Id. at 842.
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the court characterized as when “one happens upon the corpse of a
female and engages in sexual intercourse with it.”311 The social harm
difference between the two crimes is one of degree. In rape, the crimi-
nal actor achieves intercourse through the use of force;312 in necro-
philia, there is no force.313
The decision in Lipham reflects the majority approach that a
live body is not required to convict the defendant for rape.314 But
California and Nevada, states with necrophilia laws, have limited rape
convictions to offenders who have violated living persons.315 These
states reason, more or less, that corpses are not living persons and
therefore it is legally impossible to rape a corpse.316 In People v. Kelly,
for example, the California Supreme Court reasoned: “‘[t]he essen-
tial guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the person and feelings of
the victim of the rape. . . .’ A dead body has no feelings of outrage.”317
In his dissent to a 1996 case in which the Nevada Supreme
Court concluded that necrophilia was the more appropriate label for
a perimortem sexual assault where it is unclear exactly when the
sexual contact occurred, Chief Justice Thomas L. Steffen explained
this paradox:
Victims of imminent sexual assault, fighting and resisting to the
end, are thus thought to suffer no indignity or outrage because
they have succumbed to their attackers’ violence prior to being
sexually violated. Because they are dead, their efforts to resist
sexual assault, thereby making it clear that it would be accom-
plished without their consent, do not carry over after death.
Having suffered death before the final insult, their cries of resis-
tance, outrage, and fear no longer count. They are no longer
“persons” under the majority’s ruling.318
Even states that criminalize necrophilic acts as sexual assaults fre-
quently confront the rights and interests question, and as we have
seen, come to different conclusions. A final set of states resolves that
question by incorporating per se consent rules when it comes to
311. Id. at 842.
312. Id. at 842–43.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., State v. Brobeck, 751 S.W.2d 828, 831–32 (Tenn. 1988).
315. People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 399 (Cal. 1992); Doyle v. State, 921 P.2d 901, 914
(Nev. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16 (2004).
316. See Kelly, 822 P.2d at 399; Doyle, 921 P.2d at 914.
317. Kelly, 822 P.2d at 399–400 (quoting People v. Sellers, 250 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988)) (concluding that the proper conviction was for attempted rape). Perimortem
rape, however, can still be the basis of a felony murder conviction. Id. at 400.
318. Doyle, 921 P.2d at 919 (Steffen, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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corpses.319 In other words, sexual contact with a corpse is a criminal
violation because corpses cannot provide consent.
3. Sexual Autonomy: Per Se Consent
Out of the eighteen states that explicitly require sexual contact
with a corpse, three states—Connecticut, New York, and Wiscon-
sin—explicitly frame their anti-necrophilia laws around the notion
of consent.320 The sex offender registry laws in each state have
provisions for convicted offenders,321 although Connecticut specifi-
cally reserves discretion for the sentencing judge to base the regis-
tration requirement on a finding that registration is necessary for
public safety.322 Each of these three states also require that offend-
ers from other states register upon establishing residence.323
Connecticut’s anti-necrophilia law is contained in the penal
code’s chapter on sex offenses.324 It provides: “A person is guilty of
sexual assault in the fourth degree when . . . such person engages
in sexual contact with an animal or dead body.”325 The entire group
of fourth-degree sexual assaults in Section 53a-73a is framed
around the social value of consent.326 Subsection (a)(2) summarizes
the consent focus of this section: “A person is guilty of sexual assault
in the fourth degree when . . . such person subjects another person
to sexual contact without such other person’s consent.”327
Consent is not defined in the statutory text,328 but the remain-
ing subsections enumerate various sex acts that by statutory defini-
tion lack consent.329 For example, subsections (a)(1)(A)–(B) set out
319. See infra Appendix.
320. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a(a)(3) (West 2019); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1)
(Consol. 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4)(c) (West 2018).
321. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(a) (West 2015); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-f
(Consol. 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(1g)(a) (West 2020). For additional details, see
infra Appendix.
322. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(c) (West 2015).
323. Id. § 54-253(a); N.Y.CORREC.LAW § 168-a(2)(d) (Consol. 2018) (“provided that the
elements of such crime of conviction are substantially the same”); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.45(1g)(g) (West 2020) (“has been found to have committed a sex offense by another
jurisdiction”).
324. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a(b) (West 2019).
325. Id. § 53a-73a(a). Sexual assault in the fourth degree is a misdemeanor offense
unless the victim is under the age of sixteen, in which case it is a class D felony. Id. § 53a
-73a(b).
326. See id. § 53a-73a(a).
327. Id.
328. See id. § 53a-65 (providing definitions relevant to Sex Offenses division of the
Penal Code). But see Efstathiadis v. Holder, 119 A.3d 522, 526 (Conn. 2015) (relying on
various dictionary definitions of consent).
329. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-73a (West 2019); see also State v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 866,
871 (Conn. 1987) (recognizing that the statute “proscribe[s] nonconsensual sexual contact”).
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Connecticut’s statutory rape law.330 Subsection (a)(1)(C) criminalizes
sexual contact with those who are “physically helpless.”331 Other
subsections prohibit sexual contact between minors and their guard-
ians,332 institutional wards and their keepers,333 patients and their
psychotherapists,334 students and school employees,335 and minor
athletes and their coaches.336 These per se lack of consent scenarios
demonstrate the legislature’s intent to criminalize sexual activity in
“situations in which one party may be under the control of the
other.”337 As the Penal Code drafters asserted in the accompanying
Commentary: “Both sexual assault in the first degree [forcible rape]
and sexual assault in the fourth degree were designed to protect
society from sexual contact without voluntary agreement.”338
Defendants who violate the consent norms established in Con-
necticut’s Section 53a-73a are also subject to mandatory registration
on the state’s sex offender registry, but may be exempted if the
sentencing court finds that registration is “not required for public
safety.”339 In a 2017 case, a defendant pleaded guilty to sexual assault
in the fourth degree after having sex with his girlfriend who had
overdosed on drugs.340 During sentencing, the defendant asserted that
he believed his girlfriend to be unconscious, not dead, when he tied her
ankles and wrists to the bedposts before having sex with her.341 Under
these facts, the sentencing court concluded that the defendant’s
registration as a sex offender was “not required for public safety.”342
New York likewise punishes necrophilic acts as a crime of sexual
misconduct, a class A misdemeanor.343 In New York, “[t]he crime of
sexual misconduct overlaps with the crime of rape.”344 Every sex of-
fense in Article 130 of the New York Penal Code includes lack of
consent as an element.345 Section 130.05 defines lack of consent as
330. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2019).
331. Id. § 53a-73(a)(1)(C).
332. Id. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(D).
333. Id. § 53a-73a(a)(1)(E).
334. Id. § 53a-73a(a)(4).
335. Id. § 53a-73a(a)(6).
336. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a(a)(7) (West 2019).
337. Efstathiadis v. Holder, 119 A.3d 522, 528–29 (Conn. 2015) (quoting the drafters’
commentary to the Connecticut Penal Code).
338. Id. at 528.
339. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-251(a)–(c) (West 2019).
340. David Owens, Willimantic Man Pleads Guilty To Having Sex With Dead Woman,




343. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20(3) (Consol. 2003).
344. People v. Hough, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (Crim. Ct. 1994).
345. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1) (Consol. 2018).
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resulting from, inter alia, forcible compulsion or incapacity to con-
sent.346 The same section further provides a list of classes of people
who are deemed incapable of consent, including minors under sev-
enteen years of age, persons with mental disabilities, persons with
mental incapacities, persons who are physically helpless, or persons
under custody, supervision, or under medical, psychotherapeutic, or
residential care.347 Like Connecticut and Wisconsin, New York re-
quires offenders convicted of sex offenses in other jurisdictions to
register as a sex offender in New York “provided that the elements
of such crime of conviction are substantially the same.”348
In Wisconsin, the criminal prohibition against necrophilia is
explicitly tied to the notion of sexual autonomy and consent.349 The
law defines consent as “words or overt actions by a person who is
competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agree-
ment to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”350 It also pro-
vides for presumed incapacity for those who suffer from mental illness,
are unconscious, or are physically incapable of communicating their
unwillingness to an act.351 Necrophilia is made criminal through a
specific provision at the end of Wisconsin’s comprehensive sexual
assault statute,352 which provides: “This section applies whether a
victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual contact or sexual
intercourse.”353 The idea that necrophilia is understood as a crime
that violates the value of consent was illustrated in the 2008 case,
State v. Grunke.354
After seeing a photo of the deceased victim in her obituary,
twenty-year-old Nicholas Grunke decided that he wanted to have sex
with her.355 With the help of his twin brother and another friend,
Grunke plotted to dig up the victim’s body, transfer it to a new lo-
cation, and then have sex with her.356 To execute this plan, the defen-
dants first drove to the cemetery to locate the deceased’s gravesite.357
346. Id. § 130.05(2).
347. Id. § 130.05(3).
348. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a(2)(d) (Consol. 2018); see supra note 323 and accom-
panying text.
349. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4),(7) (West 2018).
350. Id. § 940.225(4).
351. Id. § 940.225(4)(b)–(c).
352. Id. § 940.225(1)-(3m). The relevant section outlines a series of sexual assault
crimes ranging from first to fourth degree. Id.
353. Id. § 940.225(7).
354. State v. Grunke, 752 N.W.2d 769, 775–76 (Wis. 2008).
355. Id. at 771; Just because it’s not illegal doesn’t mean it’s OK, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14929873/ns/us_news-weird_news/t/just-be
cause-its-not-illegal-doesnt-mean-its-ok/#.XKFeFC2ZPOQ [http://perma.cc/2XUN-XZ8A].
356. Grunke, 752 N.W.2d at 771.
357. Id.
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After going offsite to purchase various materials to exhume the
corpse as well as a box of condoms, they returned to the gravesite
and began digging.358 When the defendants uncovered the top of the
deceased’s concrete vault, they realized that they would not be able
to pry it open.359 At this same time, a local police officer who had
been alerted to a suspicious vehicle at the cemetery discovered the
defendants as they were attempting to flee the crime scene.360
The State charged Grunke and his co-defendants with attempted
third-degree sexual assault.361 After a preliminary hearing, the circuit
court determined that the anti-necrophilia statute did not apply to
cases where the accused did not cause the victim’s death and refused
to bind over the defendants.362 The intermediate appellate court
affirmed, under the same rationale.363 The appellate court addition-
ally reasoned that, because the sexual assault statutory scheme
required the State to prove lack of consent and a corpse could never
give consent, the anti-necrophilia provision was ambiguous.364
In reversing the appellate court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
disposed of the ambiguity argument by declaring there was no
“incompatibility between, on the one hand, a victim being incapable
of consent because the victim is dead and, on the other hand, . . .
[the] requirement that sexual intercourse occur ‘without the con-
sent’ of the victim.”365 Simply because it would be much easier for
the State to prove that a dead victim did not provide affirmative
consent did not mean, the Court reasoned, that the requirement in
a necrophilia case was superfluous.366 The court acknowledged that
consent was a key element in the state’s sexual assault laws.367 In
ratifying the prosecutor’s strategy to pursue attempted sexual assault
charges, the court also affirmed the notion, inherent in the prosecu-




361. Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(3) (West 2018) (third-degree sexual assault);
§ 939.32 (West 2014) (attempt).
362. Grunke, 752 N.W.2d at 771–72.
363. State v. Grunke, 738 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d, State v. Grunke,
752 N.W.2d 769 (Wis. 2008).
364. Id. at 141–43 (citing State v. Holt, 382 N.W.2d 679 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), super-
seded by statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West 1986)). In State v. Holt, a perimortem
rape case prior to the enactment of the anti-necrophilia provision, where the court held
that “in a rape-murder case where the exact sequence of events cannot be proved, the
jury may reasonably infer . . . that the victim was alive during the sexual assault.” 382
N.W.2d at 685.
365. State v. Grunke, 752 N.W.2d 769, 775–76 (Wis. 2008).
366. Id. at 776.
367. See id. at 775.
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the social harm calculus under Wisconsin law.368 This understand-
ing also further legitimizes the Wisconsin law requiring necrophiles
convicted in other states to register as sex offenders in Wisconsin.369
CONCLUSION
In the common law tradition, John Stuart Mill may have been the
first to articulate the limits of state power according to a harm princi-
ple.370 Mill famously argued that the limit of individual freedoms
was the point at which exercise of that freedom interferes with the
interests of another.371 For Mill, it was fundamental that a democratic
society demand an articulation of the harm to others before the state
could operate to curtail the individual’s freedom through execution of
the criminal law.372 In the preceding Article, what I mean by social
harms are the interests and rights that are infringed by another’s
actions and are therefore the basis of legitimate criminal sanction.373
Necrophilia implicates a variety of social harms, as evidenced
by the range of justifications that states currently provide for criminal-
izing associated behaviors. Although necrophilia has been highly
suspect and generally abhorred for millennia, we still do not share
a common understanding about the social harm or harms associated
with this crime. I had hoped that studying what I assumed was a
simple and straightforward example of sexual assault against a dead
human body would reveal some insights about the notions of con-
sent and sexual autonomy that are now the core of rape law.
In this regard, however, the survey of anti-necrophilia laws
presented above generates more questions than it does fixed and
satisfactory answers. Although the majority of states coalesce on a
general definition of the crime as sexual contact with a corpse, even
these states cannot find agreement on how severe the related harm
is, the result of which are penal consequences ranging from fines to
life in prison for essentially the exact same behavior.374 The mixed
368. See id. at 776–78.
369. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(1g)(g) (West 2020) (“has been found to have committed
a sex offense by another jurisdiction”).
370. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Mill’s On Liberty and the Modern “Harm to Others”
Principle, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 163, 163 (Markus D.
Dubber ed. 2014).
371. Id. (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ONLIBERTY 9 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (“[T]he only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”).
372. See id. at 165–71 (attempting to distinguish the expansive “modern” harm principle
which includes all types of generic harms, as asserted by Lord Patrick Devlin, from Mill’s
original attempt to craft a limiting principle against the excesses of the state).
373. See id. at 165 (“Mill framed the notion of harm within a liberal structure of
recognized legal rights”).
374. See infra Appendix.
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bag of state laws on necrophilia surveyed above betrays the subjective
nature of criminal law-making. And while there is value to allowing
states to experiment and to configure their criminal laws in the ways
that make most sense to each state’s special circumstances, the lack
of uniformity among the states can cause confusion and uncertainty
for convicted offenders and could potentially undermine sex offender
registry laws designed to protect the public from sexual predators.
Even though necrophilia prosecutions are infrequent (and appellate
decisions even more rare), the important rights and interests ques-
tions identified here are already ripe for further consideration.
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
AL Family: outrage 
(felony)
“A person commits the crime of abuse of a
corpse if, except as otherwise authorized by
law, he knowingly treats a human corpse in a
way that would outrage ordinary family sensi-
bilities.”
AK Sex offense: dead
body required
“A person commits the crime of misconduct
involving a corpse if  . . . the person engages
in sexual penetration of a corpse.”
AZ Sex offense:
necrophilia
“It is unlawful for a person to engage in
necrophilia.  A person engages in necrophilia
by: (1) Having sexual intercourse with a dead
human body (2) Having sexual contact with a
dead human body, other than the contact
normally required to store, prepare, disinfect
or embalm a dead human body according to





“A person commits abuse of a corpse if . . .
she knowingly: Physically mistreats or con-
ceals a corpse in a manner offensive to a per-
son of reasonable sensibilities.”
CA Sex offense: dead
body required
“Every person who willfully mutilates, disin-
ters, removes from the place of interment, or
commits an act of sexual penetration on, or
has sexual contact with, any remains known
to be human, without authority of law, is
guilty of a felony.”
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
CO Family: outrage 
(misdemeanor)
“A person commits abuse of a corpse if, with-
out statutory or court-ordered authority, he
or she . . . Treats the body or remains of any
person in a way that would outrage normal
family sensibilities.”
CT Sex offense: consent
“A person is guilty of sexual assault in the
fourth degree when: . . . such person engages
in sexual contact with an animal or dead
body.”
DE Family: outrage 
(misdemeanor)
“A person is guilty of abusing a corpse when,
except as authorized by law, the person
treats a corpse in a way that a reasonable
person knows would outrage ordinary family
sensibilities.”
D.C. N/A Abuse of corpse is a tort.  Steagall v. Doctors




“A person who mutilates, commits sexual
abuse upon, or otherwise grossly abuses a





“A person commits the offense of necrophilia
when he performs any sexual act with a dead
human body involving the sex organs of the
one and the mouth, anus, penis, or vagina of
the other.”
HI Family: outrage 
(misdemeanor)
“A person commits the offense of abuse of a
corpse if, except as authorized by law, the
person: . . . [t]reats a human corpse in a way
that the person knows would outrage ordi-
nary family sensibilities.”
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
ID CAN
“Every person who is guilty of the infamous
crime against nature, committed with man-
kind or with any animal, is punishable by





“A person commits abuse of a corpse if he or
she intentionally . . . engages in sexual con-




“A person who knowingly or intentionally . . .
has sexual intercourse or other sexual con-
duct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) with





“A person commits sexual abuse of a human
corpse if the person knowingly and intention-
ally engages in a sex act, as defined in sec-
tion 702.17, with a human corpse.”  See also §
709.1 (defining “sexual abuse," which focuses




“Criminal desecration is: . . . Knowingly ob-
taining or attempting to obtain unauthorized
control of a dead body or remains of any hu-
man being or the coffin, urn or other article
containing a dead body or remains of any
human being.”
KY Family: outrage 
(felony)
“A person is guilty of abuse of a corpse when
except as authorized by law he intentionally





“A person is guilty of abuse of corpse if he
intentionally and unlawfully disinters, digs
up, removes, conceals, mutilates or destroys
a human corpse, or any part or the ashes
thereof.”
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
MD CAN
“A person may not . . . commit another un-
natural or perverted sexual practice with
another or with an animal." 
MA CAN
“Whoever commits the abominable and de-
testable crime against nature, either with
mankind or with a beast, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not
more than twenty years.” See also Mass.




“A person, not being lawfully authorized so to
do, who shall wilfully dig up, disinter,
remove, or convey away a human body, or
the remains thereof, from the place where
the body may be interred or deposited . . .
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than 10 years, or by
fine of not more than $5,000.00.”
MN CAN “Whoever carnally knows a dead body or an
animal or bird is guilty of bestiality.”
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
MS Mistreatment of
corpse
“Every person who shall remove the dead
body of any human being from the grave or
other place of interment for the purpose of . .
. mere wantonness, or who shall wantonly
dig into or open the grave or other place of
interment where the remains of any dead
human body is interred, or wantonly disturb
the remains of any dead human body therein
interred, shall upon conviction be imprisoned
in the penitentiary not exceeding five years
or in the county jail not more than one year,
or be fined not more than five hundred dol-
lars or both.”; “Every person who shall know-
ingly and willfully dig up, except as other-
wise provided by law, obliterate, or in any
way desecrate any cemetery where human
dead are interred, or cause through word,
deed or action the same to happen, shall
upon conviction be imprisoned for not more
than one (1) year in the county jail or fined
not more than Five Hundred Dollars






“A person is guilty of a misdemeanor and
may be fined not more than $500 or be im-
prisoned in the county jail for not more than
1 year, or both, if the person . . . without an
order from the coroner or state medical ex-
aminer, purposely touches, removes, or dis-
turbs a corpse, its clothing, or anything near
the corpse.”
NB N/A
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
NV Sex offense: dead
body required
“A person who commits a sexual penetration
on the dead body of a human being is guilty
of a category A felony and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for life
with the possibility of parole.”
NH Mistreatment of
corpse
“A person is guilty of a misdemeanor if he
unlawfully removes, conceals or destroys a
corpse or any part thereof.”
NJ Sex offense: dead
body required
“A person commits a crime of the second de-
gree if he . . . Commits an act of sexual pene-
tration or sexual contact, as defined in
N.J.S.2C:14-1, upon human remains.”
NM N/A
NY Sex offense: consent
“A person is guilty of sexual misconduct
when . . . [h]e or she engages in sexual con-
duct with an animal or a dead human body.”
NC CAN
“If any person shall commit the crime against
nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be
punished as a Class I felon.”  N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-177
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
ND Sex offense: dead
body required
“Deviate sex act” means “any form of sexual
contact with an animal, bird, or dead
person.”  N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-02(2).
OH Family: outrage 
(misdemeanor)
“No person, except as authorized by law,
shall treat a human corpse in a way that the





“No person shall remove any part of the dead
body of a human being from any grave or
other place where the same has been buried,
or from any place where the same is depos-
ited while awaiting burial, with intent to sell
the same, or to dissect it without authority of
law, or from malice or wantonness.”
OR Sex offense: dead
body required
“A person commits the crime of abuse of
corpse in the first degree if the person . . .
Engages in sexual activity with a corpse or
involving a corpse.”
PA Family: outrage 
(misdemeanor)
“Except as authorized by law, a person who
treats a corpse in a way that he knows would
outrage ordinary family sensibilities commits
a misdemeanor of the second degree.”
RI Sex offense:
necrophilia
“Any person who performs the act of first
degree sexual assault upon a dead human
body shall be guilty of the crime of
necrophilia.”
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Class E felony—1 to
6 years in prison




































State Social Harm Statutory Text
SC Mistreatment of
corpse
“It is unlawful for a person wilfully and
knowingly, and without proper legal author-
ity to . . . desecrate human remains.”
SD Mistreatment of
corpse
“Every person who removes all or any part of
the dead body of a human being from a grave
or other place where the same has been bur-
ied, or from any place where the same is de-
posited while awaiting burial, with intent to
sell the same or to dissect it without author-
ity of law, or from malice or wantonness, is
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.”
TN Family: outrage 
(felony)
“A person commits an offense who, without
legal privilege, knowingly . . . [p]hysically
mistreats a corpse in a manner offensive to




“A person commits an offense if the person,
without legal authority, knowingly . . . disin-
ters, disturbs, damages, dissects, in whole or
in part, carries away, or treats in an offen-
sive manner a human corpse.”
UT Sex offense: dead
body required
“A person is guilty of abuse or desecration of
a dead human body if the person intention-
ally and unlawfully: commits or attempts to
commit upon any dead human body any act
of sexual penetration, regardless of the sex of
the actor and of the dead human body.” Part
(2)(e) requires sexual penetration (defined as
any penetration, however slight).
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State Citation Title of Law Organized Under Penalty 
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Felony, up to five
years imprisonment
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
VT Mistreatment of
corpse
“A person who, not being authorized by law,
intentionally excavates, disinters, removes,
or carries away a human body, or the
remains thereof, interred or entombed in this
State, or intentionally excavates, disinters,
removes, or carries away an object interred
or entombed with a human body in this
State, or knowingly aids in such excavation,
disinterment, removal, or carrying away, or
is accessory thereto, shall be imprisoned not




“If a person willfully and intentionally physi-
cally defiles a dead human body he is guilty
of a Class 6 felony.”
WA Sex offense: dead
body required
“Any person who has sexual intercourse or
sexual contact with a dead human body is
guilty of a class C felony.”
WV Family: felony
“For the purposes of this subsection,
‘desecrate’ means destroying, cutting, muti-
lating, effacing, injuring, tearing down, re-
moving, defacing, damaging or otherwise
physically mistreating in a way that a rea-
sonable person knows will outrage the sensi-
bilities of persons likely to observe or
discover his or her actions.”
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State Citation Title of Law Organized Under Penalty 
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State Social Harm Statutory Text
WI Sex offense: consent
Subsection (7) of the sexual assault statute
specifically provides that dead bodies are also




“[A] person who dissects or mutilates a dead
human body is guilty of a felony punishable
by imprisonment for not more than five (5)
years, a fine of not more than ten thousand





“Toda persona que ilegalmente mutile,
desentierre o remueva de su sepultura, o del
lugar en que se halle aguardando el momento
de ser enterrado o cremado, el cadáver de un
ser humano o parte del mismo, o sus restos o
cenizas, o que de otra forma los profane, será
sancionada con pena de reclusión por un
término fijo de tres (3) años.”
UCMJ Catch-all provision for other crimes
